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INTRODUCTION
Since the advent of the Negotiable Instruments Law (the N.I.L.)
in 1895, American commercial lawyers and their academic cousins
have focused nearly all of their energy on instruments that are negoti-
able. There has been correspondingly little said or written about
nonnegotiable instruments. This omission is unfortunate, for in the
field of mortgage lending, nonnegotiable promissory notes continue to
be widely used.
This article reviews what we know about transferring owner-
ship and the right of enforcement of nonnegotiable notes. The focus
will be on notes secured by mortgages, since this is likely the context in
which most modern nonnegotiable notes are created. There has been a
A Dean and Professor of Law Emeritus, University of Missouri-Columbia. This article
was prepared while the author was visiting professor of law at the Multimedia University,
Malacca, Malaysia. Appreciation is expressed to the members of the academic and adminis-
trative staff there for their kind assistance. The author also thanks Wilson Freyermuth,
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vast amount of litigation about the transfer of negotiable mortgage
notes in the past half decade, greatly expanding our understanding,
but there has been little development involving nonnegotiable notes.
Hence, it is helpful to compare negotiable and nonnegotiable notes,
with particular emphasis on how each is transferred. Perhaps ironi-
cally, this means that the bulk of this article discusses negotiable notes
as a point of reference, despite the fact that its ultimate focus is non-
negotiable notes.
Part I of this article reviews the history of the definition of nego-
tiability, and shows how our current understanding of negotiability
came to be. Part II demonstrates how to tell the difference between
negotiable and nonnegotiable notes, and why that difference is impor-
tant. Part III discusses the meaning of “transfer” of a promissory note.1
Part IV examines specifically how the right to enforce nonnegotiable
notes can be transferred under present law, and considers whether
changes are needed. Finally, this article concludes with a brief descrip-
tion of a proposed national mortgage registry that has the potential to
make transfers of both negotiable and nonnegotiable mortgage notes
far more efficient without disrupting the current legal regime.
I. A BRIEF HISTORY OF NEGOTIABILITY
A. The Functions of Negotiability in Nineteenth Century
American Law
It is obvious that nonnegotiability can be understood only by
way of comparison with negotiability, so that is where this article must
begin. There are many varieties of negotiable instruments – bills of
lading, warehouse receipts, bills of exchange, etc. – but only two types
that represent promises or orders to pay money: checks and promissory
notes.2 Mortgage borrowers nearly always sign notes, so notes, rather
than checks or other forms of instruments, are the focus here.
A negotiable note is a contract to pay money, of course, but it
has characteristics that differ from those of other contracts involving
payment of money. Typically, the most salient of those unique charac-
teristics are understood as follows:
1. There are many aspects of nonnegotiable notes besides their transfer that might be
discussed: the liabilities and defenses of parties, warranties of transferors, and waivers of
defenses, to name a few. But these topics are not the subject of the present article. See
William F. Willier, Nonnegotiable Instruments, 11 SYRACUSE L. REV. 13 (1959).
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(1) The right to enforce payment on a negotiable note can be trans-
ferred by indorsement and delivery, or by delivery alone if the
note was made to (or has previously been indorsed to) “bearer.”
(2) If the transferee takes the note in good faith, without notice of
defenses that the maker of the note might have, and pays value,
the transferee will be deemed a “holder in due course” and will
have immunity from certain defenses that the maker could oth-
erwise raise.3
These characteristics were essential to the primary purpose of
notes issued by banks in the United States prior to the Civil War: to
serve as currency.4 Until 1861, there was no government-issued paper
money to serve as legal tender, and notes issued by private banks were
the primary medium of exchange.5 It is obvious that the features of
negotiability mentioned above—transferability by delivery and immu-
nity from the issuer’s defenses—were indispensable to the use of
private bank notes as currency. Transferability by delivery meant that
no cumbersome “transaction” (such as indorsement or execution of a
separate assignment) was necessary when the note changed hands; it
could simply be handed over. Immunity from the issuer’s defenses
meant that one who accepted a bank note as currency did not need to
worry about whether some defect in the process by which the note was
issued would permit the bank to refuse to honor it.6
3. NELSON ET AL., REAL ESTATE FINANCE LAW §§ 5.28-29 (6th ed. 2014).
4. The concept of the negotiable note was derived from the English bill of exchange,
which was widely used by merchants as early as the Seventeenth Century. The story of how
bills of exchange were developed, and how their characteristics were transmuted to promis-
sory notes, is omitted here, but is amply and entertainingly recounted in Kurt Eggert, Held
up in Due Course: Codification and the Victory of Form over Intent in Negotiable Instrument
Law, 35 CREIGHTON L. REV. 363, 377-400 (2002).
5. See Davis R. Dewey, State Banking Before the Civil War, FRASER (1910), https://fra
ser.stlouisfed.org/scribd/?title_id=656&filepath=/docs/historical/nmc/nmc_581_1910.pdf#scr
ibd-open. It has been estimated that notes of between five and ten thousand banks were in
circulation in the U.S. in 1861. See also OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, A
SHORT HISTORY, U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY 6 (2011), http://www.occ.gov/about/what-we-
do/history/OCC%20history%20final.pdf.
6. Technically, only “personal” and not “real” defenses were immunized, but this was
sufficient to provide reasonable assurance of payment to those who accepted the notes as
currency. The distinctions between the two categories of defenses are outlined in NELSON ET
AL., supra note 3, at § 5.31. This is not to say that use of private bank notes as currency was
a desirable or efficient system. Anyone accepting such a note was subject to the risk that the
issuing bank might become insolvent, and since there were thousands of issuers, this was a
very difficult risk to manage. Moreover, counterfeiting was rampant. Congress authorized
the United States Treasury to issue paper money for the first time in 1861 in the form of
non-interest bearing Treasury Notes called Demand Notes. Their principal purpose was to
finance the expense of the Civil War. They were replaced with United States Notes, com-
monly called “greenbacks,” in 1862. This new federal currency quickly became popular in
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After the Civil War, the issuance of private bank notes gradu-
ally faded,7 supplanted by federally-issued currency. Slowly, the focus
of bank lending changed. Banks had always made business and farm
loans, but consumer lending gradually began to occur in the second
half of the Nineteenth Century.8 Beginning in the 1920s, and acceler-
ating in a major way after the Second World War, the banks made
consumer and home mortgage lending an increasingly important part
of their business model.9 They were hugely successful. By the end of
2012, outstanding home mortgage loans stood at more than $9 trillion,
with non-mortgage consumer debt more than an additional $2.5 tril-
lion. The aggregate comprised more than one-fourth of all U.S. debt.10
This shift to a major emphasis on consumer and home mortgage
lending had important implications for the characteristics of negotiable
notes. When bank notes were used as currency, banks were the makers
of notes and consumers were the holders. In consumer lending transac-
tions, these roles were reversed: consumers were the makers, and
banks the holders of the notes. This gave banks an incentive to use
their political power to broaden the definition of negotiability and in-
crease their rights as holders. As we will see below, that is precisely
what they did.
B. The Evolving Definition of Negotiability
When the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform
State Laws was formed and began meeting in 1892, one of its first
projects was the codification of the law of negotiable instruments. As a
result, the “Negotiable Instruments Law” or “N.I.L.” was approved by
the Conference at its 1895 meeting, and was ultimately adopted by
tice of issuing it was continued after the end of the War. See ARTHUR L. FRIEDBERG & IRA S.
FRIEDBERG, PAPER MONEY OF THE UNITED STATES 8 (8th ed. 1962).
7. A 2% tax on state bank notes was authorized in 1864 to encourage conversion to
the new system. This number was increased the next year to 10%, and then to 20%. Private
bank notes were essentially taxed out of existence, and banks turned to checking accounts
as a device to make themselves profitable. See GARY B. GORTON, THE MAZE OF BANKING:
HISTORY, THEORY, CRISIS 13 (2015).
8. Lendol Calder, Beautiful Credit! The Foundation of Modern Society, in FINANCING
THE AMERICAN DREAM: A CULTURAL HISTORY OF CONSUMER CREDIT 37 (2001).
9. See THOMAS A. DURKIN ET AL., CONSUMER CREDIT AND THE AMERICAN ECONOMY 5-6
(1st ed. 2014).
10. Id. Total debt of nonfinancial sectors of the U.S. economy stood at about $40 trillion
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every state.11 With some amendments in 1929,12 it remained the es-
sential source of law on the subject until the adoption of Article 3 of the
Uniform Commercial Code in 1951. Article 3, in turn, was substan-
tially revised in 1990, with additional (but more minor) revisions in
2002.
Under the original N.I.L, the definition of negotiability was sim-
ple indeed.13 To be negotiable, the instrument had to satisfy four tests:
First, It must be in writing and signed by the maker or drawer;
Second, It must contain an unconditional promise or order to pay a
certain sum in money;
Third, It must be payable on demand or at a fixed or determinable
future time;
Fourth, It must be payable to order or to bearer. . . .14
This definition must have seemed adequate for the simple promissory
notes of the Nineteenth Century. But when the banks increasingly be-
came the payees rather than the makers of negotiable notes, the notes
themselves began to grow drastically in length and complexity as bank
lawyers inserted more and more language designed to assure payment
and facilitate collection. In particular, consumer notes were often se-
cured by liens on real or personal property of the debtor, a situation
quite different than the unsecured bank notes that had served as cur-
rency before the Civil War. The banks wanted to ensure that there
were provisions in the notes referring to the security property.
At the same time, the banks were eager for the notes they took
from consumers to be regarded as negotiable. There were two obvious
reasons for this. First, the N.I.L. gradually became uniform nationwide
law, eliminating many of the often annoying and confusing differences
in interpretation between one state and another that had previously
prevailed. But this highly desirable uniformity was available only if
the note was negotiable, since the N.I.L. did not apply to nonnegotiable
notes. Second, only if a note was negotiable could the bank sell it to
another investor on the secondary market with the assurance that the
11. By 1902, the N.I.L. had been adopted by twenty states. See Amasa M. Eaton, The
Negotiable Instruments Law: Its History and Its Practical Operation, 2 MICH. L. REV. 260
(1904); see also Charles L. McKeehan, The Negotiable Instruments Law. (A Review of the
Ames-Brewster Controversy.) First Paper, 50 AM. L. REGISTER 437 (1902).
12. See Roscoe B. Turner, Revision of the Negotiable Instruments Law (Yale Faculty
Scholarship Series, Paper 4466, 1928).
13. References to the N.I.L. are found in ROBERT E. BUNKER, THE NEGOTIABLE INSTRU-
MENTS LAW WITH ANNOTATIONS (1905), https://ia801407.us.archive.org/3/items/negotiablein
str00britgoog/negotiableinstr00britgoog.pdf [hereinafter N.I.L.].
14. Id. at § 3. A fifth requirement, that where the instrument is addressed to a drawee
he must be named or otherwise indicated with reasonable certainty, is omitted in the text
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investor would, under the Holder in Due Course doctrine, take free of
any personal defenses the consumer might attempt to raise. This
much-sought feature made notes a great deal more marketable in sec-
ondary transactions.
Historically, it was held that, to be negotiable, a note had to be
free of extraneous promises – a “courier without luggage,” as one fa-
mous opinion put it.15 As notes became more complicated, the banks
were faced with a dilemma: how could they preserve the benefits of
negotiability while adding provisions that contravened the simplicity
that was supposed to be its hallmark? This bit of legerdemain could be
accomplished only by legislation. The banks persuaded the drafters of
the N.I.L., and subsequently the U.C.C., to move matters in their
direction.
Professor Kurt Eggert has recounted the history of this effort
thoroughly, and it need not be repeated here in detail.16 The original
N.I.L. itself liberalized the definition of negotiability in at least two
ways, as compared with prior state law. It authorized clauses obligat-
ing the maker of the instrument to pay costs of collection and
attorney’s fees, contrary to the preexisting rule in a number of states.17
It recognized negotiability despite the presence of the maker’s seal on
the instrument, contrary to the law merchant and numerous cases.18
Other N.I.L. provisions, while not contrary to the common law, were
surely highly advantageous to the banking industry, including a pro-
viso that a negotiable note could recite that it was secured by
collateral, and that the collateral could be sold upon default in pay-
ment of the note.19
When the N.I.L. was transmuted into Article 3 of the Uniform
Commercial Code in the late 1940s and early 1950s,20 the drafters gave
serious consideration to adopting a “two-track” system, in which nego-
tiable notes made by consumers would give the makers rights and
protections beyond those that would be available to commercial bor-
15. “[A] negotiable bill or note is a courier without luggage. It is a requisite that it be
framed in the fewest possible words, and those importing the most certain and precise con-
tract.” Overton v. Tyler, 3 Pa. 346, 347 (1846). The N.I.L. agreed in substance, providing “An
instrument which contains an order or promise to do any act in addition to the: payment of
money is nonnegotiable.” N.I.L., supra note 13, at § 7.
16. Eggert, supra note 4, at 416-23.
17. N.I.L., supra note 13, at § 4 and comment 5.
18. Id. at § 8 and comment 4.
19. Id. at § 7 and comment 2.
20. Article 3 was formally adopted by the Uniform Laws Commission and the Ameri-
can Law Institute in 1952, and took effect in the first state to enact it, Pennsylvania, in
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rowers. For example, the holder in due course doctrine might have
been made inapplicable to consumer credit. Unsurprisingly, the bank-
ing industry vigorously opposed this notion, and the drafters
ultimately rejected it out of concern for the enactability of the resulting
statute.21 Other potential consumer protections were also omitted. For
instance, the courts, at the time Article 3 was drafted, were beginning
to develop the “close connectedness” doctrine, under which a secondary
market purchaser of a note would be denied holder in due course status
if it had a close connection with the note’s original payee.22 But not a
word of this concept was found in the text of either the original Article
3 or its subsequent revisions.23 The U.C.C. also made notes negotiable
even if they contained provisions for acceleration for default, a change
that one commentator called “iconoclastic.”24
The 1990 revision of Article 3 continued the drafters’ tradition
of deferring to banking interests. They made a number of changes to
facilitate the operations of the credit industry. Adjustable interest rate
notes were made negotiable (a step that had already been taken by
several individual state legislatures by the time the 1990 revision of
Article 3 was adopted).25 Nonrecourse notes, under which payment
could be compelled only from the collateral and not from the maker’s
other assets, became negotiable.26 The “courier without luggage” con-
cept was further weakened by the 1990 revision’s provisions that a
21. Eggert, supra note 4, at 417-23. The author’s own experience as a reporter and
observer of the drafting of legislation by the Uniform Laws Commission suggests that this
fear of the banking industry’s political power remains pervasive. Frequently, there will be
agreement among the members of a drafting committee that a particular legislative innova-
tion would be desirable as a matter of policy, but the committee will nonetheless reject it on
the ground that it would produce opposition from the banks, and that such opposition would
almost certainly kill the act’s chances of successful enactment.
22. See, e.g., Vitols v. Citizens Banking Co., 10 F.3d 1227 (6th Cir. 1993). The classic
case is Unico v. Owen, 232 A.2d 405 (N.J. 1967). But Unico found the seeds of the doctrine in
pre-U.C.C. cases such as State Nat’l Bank of El Paso, Tex. v. Cantrell, 143 P.2d 592 (N.M.
1943); Buffalo Indus. Bank v. De Marzio, 296 N.Y.S. 783 (City Ct. 1937); and First & Lum-
bermen’s Nat’l Bank of Chippewa Falls v. Buchholz, 18 N.W.2d 771 (Minn. 1945).
23. See Grant Gilmore, The Good Faith Purchase Idea and the Uniform Commercial
Code: Confessions of a Repentant Draftsman, 15 GA. L. REV. 605, 619 (1981).
24. See Note, Acceleration Clauses in Time Paper Under the NIL and the Uniform Com-
mercial Code, 101 U. PA. L. REV. 835 (1953).
25. U.C.C. § 3-112(b) (1990 rev.). For background on this change, see Thomas B. Fid-
dler, An Argument for the Alteration of the UCC to Include Variable Rate Notes As
Negotiable Instruments, 9 J.L. & COM. 115, 120 (1989).
26. Under prior case law, a nonrecourse note was regarded as a conditional promise to
pay, and hence nonnegotiable. See United Nat’l Bank of Miami v. Airport Plaza Ltd. P’ship,
537 So. 2d 608, 610 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1988). This view was reversed by U.C.C. § 3-106(b)
(1990 rev.), providing that “[a] promise or order is not made conditional . . . because pay-
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negotiable instrument could make reference to other documents “for a
statement of rights with respect to collateral, prepayment, or accelera-
tion,”27 and could contain “an undertaking or power to give, maintain,
or protect collateral to secure payment.”28 It is apparent that under
these provisions, a note could include very extensive additional cove-
nants without impairing its negotiability.
In 1975, the Federal Trade Commission disrupted this land-
scape. It published a final rule that, in substance, prohibited a
creditor’s use of the holder in due course doctrine in most non-housing
consumer loan transactions.29 It also forbade the use of express waiv-
ers of claims and defenses by consumers in those transactions.30 Thus,
a secondary market investor in consumer debt could be held to answer
for fraud or misdealing by the originating lender. The credit industry,
of course, decried this action and predicted that it would cause a vast
reduction in the availability of consumer credit, but that did not ensue.
However, the FTC rule represented only a partial solution to
the problem of assignee liability for originator misconduct. The rule
covers only natural persons purchasing goods or services for personal,
family, or household use,31 and only purchases of $54,600 or less.32
Real estate mortgages are affected only to the extent that they secure
payment for goods and services, such as the purchase of siding, paint-
ing, or other home improvements.33 The result is that a mortgage loan
to buy a house or to refinance an existing purchase-money loan is un-
touched by the FTC rule. Of course, the vast majority of home
mortgage loans would exceed the FTC’s dollar ceiling, in any event.
Exempting home mortgage lending from the FTC rule was a
major political victory for the mortgage industry. As its consequence,
mortgage loans became the only important category of consumer lend-
ing that remains subject to the holder in due course rule. Calls for the
27. U.C.C. § 3-106(b) (1990 rev.).
28. U.C.C. § 3-104(a)(3)(i).
29. See Preservation of Consumers’ Claims and Defenses, Unfair or Deceptive Acts or
Practices, 16 C.F.R. § 433.2 (1975).
30. See Michael M. Greenfield & Nina L. Ross, Limits on a Consumer’s Ability to Assert
Claims and Defenses Under the FTC’s Holder in Due Course Rule, 46 BUS. LAW. 1135 (1991).
31. 16 C.F.R. § 433.1(b).
32. The dollar limitation arises by virtue of the reference in the FTC rule to the Truth
in Lending Act and Regulation Z. See 16 C.F.R. § 433.1(d)-(e). Originally, the limitation was
$25,000, but the Dodd-Frank Act raised it to $50,000, and provision was made for annual
adjustment of the figure on the basis of fluctuations in the Consumer Price Index. The fig-
ure in the text represents the threshold for 2015. See Truth in Lending (Regulation Z), 79
Fed. Reg. 56483-01 (Sept. 22, 2014).
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FTC to modify its approach and sweep in mortgage lending have gone
unheeded.34 However, the mortgage lending industry’s protection from
the FTC rule was eroded a bit by Congress’s adoption of the Home Eq-
uity and Ownership Protection Act of 1994 (HOEPA).35 That statute
defined “high cost” (loosely termed “predatory”) home mortgage loans,
and provided that “[a]ny person who purchases or is otherwise as-
signed a mortgage [covered by the HOEPA] shall be subject to all
claims and defenses with respect to that mortgage that the consumer
could assert against the creditor of the mortgage,” unless the assignee
could not reasonably have known that the loan was covered by
HOEPA.36 Thus, secondary market purchasers of HOEPA loans gener-
ally cannot raise the holder in due course doctrine to avoid borrowers’
claims and defenses. However, the definition of mortgage loans covered
by HOEPA in its original form was narrow, and the great bulk of home
lending remained outside its scope. In 2010, the Dodd-Frank Act ex-
panded the definition of HOEPA loans to a limited extent,37 but as a
practical matter, these changes to HOEPA were relatively unimpor-
tant. The various burdens and penalties associated with HOEPA loans
are so onerous38 that most mortgage lenders avoid making them like
34. See, e.g., Lisa Keyfetz, The Home Ownership and Equity Protection Act of 1994:
Extending Liability for Predatory Subprime Loans to Secondary Mortgage Market Partici-
pants, 18 LOY. CONSUMER L. REV. 151, 167-69 (2005).
35. See 15 U.S.C. § 1641(d)(1).
36. Id.
37. CONSUMER FINANCIAL PROTECTION BUREAU, 2013 HOME OWNERSHIP AND EQUITY
PROTECTION ACT (HOEPA) RULE 10-18 (May 2, 2013), http://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/
201305_compliance-guide_home-ownership-and-equity-protection-act-rule.pdf. Effective
January 10, 2014, loans were covered by HOEPA if they met any of the following criteria
(with the dollar figures adjusted annually for inflation):
(1) The transaction’s annual percentage rate (APR) exceeds the applicable average
prime offer rate by more than 6.5 percentage points for most first-lien mortgages,
or by more than 8.5 percentage points for a first mortgage if the dwelling is per-
sonal property and the transaction is for less than $50,000;
(2) The transaction’s APR exceeds the applicable average prime offer rate by more
than 8.5 percentage points for subordinate or junior mortgages;
(3) The transaction’s points and fees exceed 5 percent of the total transaction
amount or, for loans below $20,000, the lesser of 8 percent of the total transac-
tion amount or $1,000; or
(4) The credit transaction documents permit the creditor to charge or collect a pre-
payment penalty more than 36 months after transaction closing or permit such
fees or penalties to exceed, in the aggregate, more than 2 percent of the amount
prepaid.
The coverage of the Act and rules under it are discussed in detail in HOEPA. It applies only
to loans secured by a consumer’s principal dwelling. Mortgages secured by vacation or sec-
ond homes are not covered. See also 78 Fed. Reg. 6855 (Jan. 31, 2013) (CFPB’s final rule
implementing the Dodd-Frank changes).
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the plague.39 Hence, secondary market investors in the vast bulk of
home mortgage loans made in the United States continue to have the
protection of the holder in due course doctrine.
It should be noted that, in historic terms, applying the holder in
due course concept to residential mortgage loans makes no sense at all.
The purpose of the doctrine was to allow one who accepted the transfer
of a note to do so without the need to inquire about the nature of the
original transaction in which it was issued. This was a perfectly sensi-
ble and useful trait when bank notes were used as currency. But in the
modern context, in which the note is secured by a mortgage on a resi-
dence, no one but an utter fool would accept it on the secondary market
without investigating a great deal of information about the origins of
the transaction, including the adequacy of the borrower’s credit and
the quality of the collateral. Thus, secondary market investors set up
standards that must be met for every loan they buy. These standards
include credit-worthiness, as represented by borrowers’ credit scores
and the ratio of their income to their mortgage debt service and overall
consumer debt payment obligations. They also include extensive infor-
mation about the real estate that serves as security, including
appraisals, title insurance, casualty insurance, and evidence of record-
ing of the relevant deeds and mortgages.40 All of this is the standard
“luggage” that accompanies each promissory note on its journey
through the secondary market. The “courier without luggage” concept
is laughable in this context.
What secondary market investors do not want to do, of course,
is to be forced to police the practices of the originators from whom they
buy mortgages. Instead, they want to decide for themselves how much
effort to expend in making sure that originators refrain from fraud or
other misbehavior. Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, the two government-
sponsored secondary market agencies, have always made very sub-
stantial efforts to ensure that the mortgage originators from whom
they purchase loans adhere to high standards.41 By contrast, private-
visited Oct. 24, 2015) (listing many regulatory disadvantages to lenders in making loans
covered by HOEPA).
39. See Joseph A. Woodruff & Christopher A. Driskill, Say Goodbye to Small Loans,
MORTGAGE BANKING MAGAZINE, July 2013, at 2 (“Most mortgage lenders do not make
HOEPA loans, and therefore the thresholds for high-cost loans have long acted as de facto
limits for mortgage lending.”). These authors predict that the new standards adopted for
HOEPA loans under Dodd-Frank will be treated in the same way.
40. See, e.g., SELLING GUIDE FANNIE MAE SINGLE FAMILY, 170-1031 (March 31, 2015),
https://www.fanniemae.com/content/guide/sel033115.pdf (devoting 860 pages to these “un-
derwriting standards”).
41. Id. at 1183-1224. See generally FREDDIE MAC, DOCUMENT CUSTODY PROCEDURES
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label securitizers, during the heyday of the residential securitization
markets from 2000 to 2007, made only meager efforts.42 If the holder in
due course doctrine was abrogated, and secondary market investors
were forced to bear the risk of fraudulent conduct by their originators,
their costs would doubtlessly rise, either to screen out the “bad apples,”
or to suffer the financial losses engendered by the originators’ bad be-
havior.43 If the private securitization industry, which has been
virtually shut down since mid-2007,44 manages to arise again,45 its eco-
nomics could be significantly affected by loss of the protection it has
hither-to received from the holder in due course doctrine.
Nonetheless, sound economic policy strongly favors repeal or
drastic modification of holder in due course. The reason hinges on the
relative availability of information about the propensity of particular
loan originators to engage in bad conduct. Consumer borrowers, who
enter the mortgage market only at infrequent intervals and who typi-
cally have only a limited and unsophisticated understanding of its
operations, have virtually no factual basis for identifying and avoiding
originators who are apt to engage in fraud, and they cannot gain this
42. Jeffrey Apraku Kyei, The Crisis in the United States Mortgage Market – Causes
and Solutions 34-35 (2009) (unpublished Master of Science thesis), https://www.kth.se/polo-
poly_fs/1.159631!/Menu/general/column-content/attachment/464.pdf.
43. This is doubtlessly the reason for the industry’s opposition to any change in the
holder in due course doctrine. From 2011 to the present, the Uniform Laws Commission has
pursued the drafting of the “Uniform Home Foreclosure Procedures Act.” (The author has
been an observer of the drafting process; the title of the Act has evolved during drafting and
the title just given is the current, and presumably final, one). The drafting committee has
given serious consideration to including a modification or partial repeal of the holder in due
course doctrine for residential mortgages. In response to this threat, the Securities Industry
& Financial Market Association (SIFMA), the trade association of the private-label securi-
tization industry, provided a letter denouncing the proposal and vigorously urging that the
committee “not include a repeal or limit of the Holder in Due Course Rule in the Draft.”
Letter from Christopher Killian, Managing Director of Securitization, SIFMA (approx. July
2013) (on file with author). It remains uncertain at this writing whether the proposed
changes will survive the final drafting and approval process.
44. See Brian Grow & Gaurav Singhania, The Five Challenges Facing Private Label
RMBS, ASSET SECURITIZATION REPORT (Aug. 22, 2014), http://www.structuredfinancenews
.com/news/residential_mbs/five-challenges-facing-private-label-rmbs-251826-1.html (point-
ing out that the private-label residential securitization industry has been virtually
moribund for seven years).
45. Whether this will occur is doubtful. See Alex Kangelaris, Seven Reasons Private-
Label MBS Are Not Coming Back Any Time Soon, NAT’L MORTGAGE NEWS (Apr. 1, 2015),
http://www.nationalmortgagenews.com/blogs/hearing/seven-reasons-private-label-mbs-are-
not-coming-back-any-time-soon-1041389-1.html; see also Adam Hodge, Five Questions with
Dr. Michael Stegman on the Private Label Securities Mortgage Market, U.S. DEPT. OF THE
TREASURY (June 26, 2014), http://www.treasury.gov/connect/blog/Pages/Five-Questions-
with-Dr.-Michael-Stegman-on-PLS-Market.aspx (the U.S. Department of the Treasury has
pursued the objective of reviving the private securitization industry as part of an overall
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sort of information at any reasonable cost. Secondary market investors
(including securitizers), on the other hand, participate in the market
on an ongoing or regular basis, and commonly buy loans by the
thousands. Their costs in identifying and policing bad actors, when
spread over a large number of loans, are likely to be quite modest. As a
matter of sound economics, it is obviously more efficient to impose
these risks on the parties who can best identify and avoid them. As a
lawyer and an economist from the Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland
put it, if the holder in due course rule were abandoned, we could expect
the following result:” By forcing the market to internalize the cost of
consumer compliance and spread it across all consumers, the market’s
ability to adjust costs [would be] aligned with the incentive to minimize
costs that result from a competitive marketplace.”46 In the absence of
assignee liability, these incentives are not aligned. The holder in due
course rule artificially lowers the cost of consumer compliance to the
market, eliminating the incentive to minimize those costs through
competition. Consumers, then, bear the risk of unlawful origination
practices, but lack the ability to price them into credit.47
Nonetheless, the holder in due course doctrine remains for the
present, and represents the sharpest distinction between negotiable
and nonnegotiable notes. If the holder doctrine were eliminated for res-
idential mortgage notes, one important difference between negotiable
and nonnegotiable notes would shrink drastically in importance. With
this fact in mind, this article now turns to a consideration of the conse-
quences of the banking industry’s successful preservation of the
negotiability concept.
II. IDENTIFYING NEGOTIABILITY
The banking industry’s highly successful efforts to keep resi-
dential lending within the ambit of the negotiability concept, while at
the same time broadening the definition of negotiability, have had sev-
eral important consequences. First, as a wider variety of notes, with
46. Letter from Mark B. Greenlee & Thomas J. Fitzpatrick, IV, Federal Reserve Bank
of Cleveland, to William R. Breetz, Jr., Chairman, Uniform Law Commission Drafting Com-
mittee on Residential Real Estate Mortgage Foreclosure Process and Protections (Mar. 28,
2013) (on file with author).
47. See Letter from Thomas J. Fitzpatrick, IV, & Mark B. Greenlee, Federal Reserve
Bank of Cleveland, to William R. Breetz, Jr., Chair, Drafting Committee on Residential
Mortgage Foreclosure Procedures Act (Mar. 28, 2013) (on file with author); see also Kathe-
rine M. Lehe, Cracks in the Foundation of Federal Law: Ameliorating the Ongoing Mortgage
Foreclosure Crisis Through Broader Predatory Lending Relief and Deterrence, 98 CALIF. L.
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more and more extensive pro-lender provisions, became negotiable, in-
terest in nonnegotiable notes tended to wither. As we have noted, little
scholarship devoted to nonnegotiable notes was produced after the ad-
vent of the N.I.L. in 1895.
Indeed, modern courts have often acted as though negotiable
notes are the only kind of notes that exist. In theory, one cannot deter-
mine whether a note is negotiable without first performing a
comprehensive analysis of the note’s language, comparing it with the
complex standards for negotiability mentioned above and set out in
U.C.C. Article 3.48 In practice, however, courts – especially in recent
years – have often concluded that notes before them were negotiable
with only superficial analysis, or in some cases, none at all.49 This atti-
tude is understandable, if not justifiable. First, negotiability is indeed
the correct answer most of the time, given the broad scope of negotia-
bility that has evolved through the uniform law process. Second, if a
note is negotiable, the right to enforce it is governed by a relatively
clear and concise body of statutory law: U.C.C. Article 3. On the other
hand, if it is not negotiable, the court will often be thrown into a mo-
rass of conflicting case law, most of it dating from the Nineteenth and
early Twentieth Centuries.50 Given this choice, it is easy to see why an
unstated preference for negotiability has developed.
Second, since 2007, negotiability has become a target for fore-
closure defense lawyers, who were often frustrated as the holder in due
course doctrine blocked their efforts to raise defenses on behalf of their
clients.51 In particular, they vigorously attacked the negotiability of
the standard Fannie Mae-Freddie Mac one-to-four-family residential
note.52 However, their arguments were usually obstructed by the
broadened definition of negotiability brought about by successive revi-
sions of the N.I.L and U.C.C. Article 3, combined with the practical
48. Dale A. Whitman, How Negotiability Has Fouled up the Secondary Mortgage Mar-
ket, and What To Do About It, 37 PEPP. L. REV. 737 (2010).
49. Id.
50. See cases cited at infra notes 138-143.
51. See, e.g., O. Max Gardner, III, Obstacles to Negotiability of Residential Mortgage
Notes (June 27, 2011), http://thepatriotswar.com/wp-content/uploads/Obstacles-to-Negotia
bility-of-Residential-Mortgage-Notes.pdf; Oliver Gardner, The Uniform Residential Mort-
gage Note is Not a Negotiable Instrument Under the UCC, AVVO (Dec. 15, 2011), http://www
.avvo.com/legal-guides/ugc/the-uniform-residential-mortgage-note-is-note-a-negotiable-in-
strument-under-the-ucc; Matthew D. Weidner, Boom! Mortgage Promissory Notes Are NOT
NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS . . . ONE OF FLORIDA’S BEST JUDGES FINDS . . . ,
WEIDNER LAW, http://mattweidnerlaw.com/boom-mortgage-promissory-notes-are-not-negoti-
able-instruments-one-of-floridas-best-judges-finds/ (last visited Oct. 24, 2015).
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preference of the courts for the finding of negotiability. Aside from
achieving delays by litigation, they had little success.
Let us consider some recent cases in which courts have treated
the issue of negotiability vel non seriously. A few of these cases have
involved loans on commercial real estate, but those notes are usually
hand-tailored or heavily negotiated to suit a particular transaction.
Hence, they require an individualized analysis to determine their ne-
gotiability, and it has been quite common for the courts to find them
nonnegotiable.53 By contrast, first residential mortgage notes in the
United States are nearly always written on the Fannie Mae-Freddie
Mac one-to-four-family note form, or on variations of that form re-
quired by the Federal Housing Administration or the Department of
Veterans Affairs.54 Because that note form is so widely used, the ques-
tion whether it is negotiable is of particular importance.
Surprisingly, until about 2010, it was difficult to find any case
authority applying serious and careful analysis to this question.55
Courts were (and sometimes still are) frequently guilty of uncritically
assuming that such notes were negotiable.56 In 1996, Professor Ronald
Mann wrote an article in which he opined that the Fannie Mae-Freddie
Mac note was nonnegotiable because, if the borrower wished to make a
prepayment, the note required the borrower to notify the lender that
she or he was doing so.57 This obligation, Mann speculated, would be
regarded as an “other undertaking” beyond the promise to pay the
money, and hence would deprive the note of negotiability.58
53. See, e.g., Bankers Trust v. 236 Beltway Inv., 865 F. Supp. 1186, 1193 (E.D. Va.
1994) (note was nonnegotiable because it provided for parties to renegotiate interest rate);
Marriott v. Harris, 368 S.E.2d 225, 238 (Va. 1988) (note was nonnegotiable because it incor-
porated another document to define terms of payment).
54. See Julia Patterson Forrester, Fannie Mae/Freddie Mac Uniform Mortgage Instru-
ments: The Forgotten Benefit to Homeowners, 72 MO. L. REV. 1077, 1083-87 (2007)
(estimating that more than 90% of residential loans in the United States are written on the
standard Fannie Mae-Freddie Mac forms).
55. Whitman, supra note 48. Occasionally an exceptional earlier decision took the
question seriously and provided a thoughtful analysis. See, e.g., In re AppOnline.com, Inc.,
321 B.R. 614 (E.D.N.Y. 2003); Bibler v. Arcata Invs. 2, LLC, 2005 WL 3304127 (Mich. Ct.
App. 2005).
56. See, e.g., Horvath v. Bank of New York, 641 F.3d 617, 622 (4th Cir. 2011) (the note
“plainly constitutes a negotiable instrument under” the Virginia UCC, with no analysis);
Michael D. v. GMAC Mortg., LLC, 763 F. Supp. 2d 1091, 1110 (W.D. Mo. 2011) (“A mortgage
loan is a promissory note and thus a negotiable instrument governed by the UCC”);
Deutsche Bank Nat’l Trust Co. v. Matthews, 273 P.3d 43 (Okla. 2012). Such decisions are
badly flawed when they assume that negotiability can be determined without an analysis of
the actual text of the note in question.
57. Ronald J. Mann, Searching for Negotiability in Payment and Credit Systems, 44
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Mann’s argument went untested in the courts for more than a
decade. However, once they began addressing it, every court doing so
has rejected Mann’s speculation and held that the standard residential
note is negotiable.59 They typically reason that the prepayment notice
requirement is not an “other undertaking” because (1) the borrower’s
decision to prepay principal is voluntary, and not required; (2) the pre-
payment notification requirement imposes no additional financial
liability on the borrower, and adds nothing to the promise to pay the
debt; and (3) there is no penalty if the borrower fails to give the notifi-
cation.60 Whether this is correct in any ultimate sense is hard to say;
none of the decisions are from the highest court of a state. The prepay-
ment notice obligation in the Fannie Mae-Freddie Mac form is, by its
nature, conditional; it applies only if the borrower elects to make a pre-
payment. As a matter of general principle, it is uncertain whether such
an obligation falls under Section 3-104’s proscription against “other
undertakings”,61 but thus far the courts have concluded that it does
not.
A variety of other arguments have been made in attempts to
classify the Fannie Mae-Freddie Mac residential note as nonnegoti-
able, but all of them have failed as well. For example, a New York
Bankruptcy Court found the note negotiable despite the presence of (1)
a reference to the mortgage for information concerning the order in
which payments were to be applied to principle, interest, and other
items; (2) a reference to the mortgage for the requirement that monthly
payments must include escrows for taxes and insurance; (3) supposed
ambiguity in the amount due because the date of disbursal of the loan
59. The first of these cases seems to be HSBC Bank USA. v. Gouda, 2010 WL 5128666
(N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2010) (not reported in A.3d). See also Horvath v. Bank of New
York, 641 F.3d 617, 622 (4th Cir. 2011) (Virginia law, without analysis); In re Steinberg,
2013 WL 2351797 (B.A.P. 10th Cir. 2013) (Wyoming law); Picatinny Fed. Credit Union v.
Fed. Nat’l Mortg. Ass’n, 2011 WL 1337507 (D.N.J. 2011) (unpublished); In re Sia, 2013 WL
4547312 (Bankr. N.J. 2013) (unpublished); Mesina v. CitiBank, 2012 WL 2501123 (Bkrtcy.
N.J. 2012) (unpublished); In re Kain, 2012 WL 1098465 (Bankr. S.C. 2012) (unpublished); In
re Edwards, 76 UCC Rep. Serv. 2d 220 (Bankr. E.D. Wis. 2011); In re Walker, 466 B.R. 271,
283 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 2012); Thomas v. Wells Fargo Bank, 116 So. 3d 226 (Ala. Civ. App.
2012); Wells Fargo Bank v. Clegg, 2013 WL 452790 (Conn. Super. Ct. 2013); Deutsche Bank
Nat’l Trust Co. v. Najar, 2013 WL 1791372 (Ohio 8th Ct. App. 2013) (not published in
N.E.2d); JP Morgan Chase Bank v. Murray, 63 A.3d 1258 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2013) (with mini-
mal analysis). See generally Kurt Eggert, Not Dead Yet: The Surprising Survival of
Negotiability, 66 ARK. L. REV. 145 (2013).
60. See cases cited at supra note 59.
61. A similar issue could be raised with respect to “defeasance” clauses in commercial
mortgage notes, which permit the borrower under certain circumstances to replace the real
estate with other collateral, such as U.S. Treasury obligations. The clause imposes numer-
ous complex duties on the borrower who does so, but the decision to engage in the
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was not stated; and (4) supposed uncertainty as to the amount of late
charges that might be due.62 In a similar vein, the Michigan Court of
Appeals found that a
reference in the note to a mortgage that secures its payment does
not destroy the negotiability of the note. Further, additional condi-
tions in the mortgage, such as maintenance of hazard insurance,
escrowing tax and insurance payments, an occupancy requirement,
or option to accelerate payment on the transfer or sale of the prop-
erty, do not destroy the negotiability of the note.63
An additional complexity is introduced if the Fannie Mae-Fred-
die Mac note is used in a Federal Housing Administration (FHA) or
Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) residential loan. Both of these
agencies require modifications of the standard note, including the addi-
tion of a legend that notifies the borrower of the government’s
regulatory limitations on the lender’s power to accelerate the loan for
default. For example, FHA’s mandatory legend reads as follows:
If Borrower defaults by failing to pay in full any monthly payment,
then Lender may, except as limited by regulations of the Secretary
in the case of payment defaults, require immediate payment in full
of the principal balance remaining due and all accrued interest.
Lender may choose not to exercise this option without waiving its
rights in the event of any subsequent default. In many circum-
stances regulations issued by the Secretary will limit Lender’s
rights to require immediate payment in full in the case of payment
defaults. This Note does not authorize acceleration when not per-
mitted by HUD regulations. As used in this Note, “Secretary”
means the Secretary of Housing and Urban Development or his or
her designee.64
The modifications usually made to the standard note for VA home
loans are similar.65 Foreclosure defense lawyers have argued vigor-
62. In re AppOnline.com, Inc., 321 B.R. at 622-24.
63. Mary Margaret Bibler v. Arcata Invs. 2, LLC, 2005 WL 3304127, at *4 (Mich. Ct.
App. 2005).
64. Chapter 6, Section B. Mortgage and Note Forms, http://portal.hud.gov/hudportal/
documents/huddoc?id=4155-2_6_secB.pdf.
65. See U.S. DEP’T OF VETERANS AFFAIRS VETERANS BENEFITS ADMIN., VA LOAN ELEC-
TRONIC REPORTING INTERFACE VA SERVICER GUIDE VERSION 1.2 59-89 (2009), http://www
.benefits.va.gov/homeloans/documents/docs/va_servicer_guide.pdf. VA requires implementa-
tion of loss mitigation procedures prior to foreclosure. 38 C.F.R. § 36.4337 (providing that
“[r]egulations issued under 38 U.S.C. chapter 37 and in effect on the date of any loan which
is submitted and accepted or approved for a guaranty or for insurance thereunder, shall
govern the rights, duties, and liabilities of the parties to such loan and any provisions of the
loan instruments inconsistent with such regulations are hereby amended and supplemented
to conform thereto.”). This language is typically repeated in paragraph 12 of the VA note,
although there seems to be no regulation or handbook provision requiring it to be incorpo-
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ously that the addition of this sort of language makes the note
nonnegotiable, on the basis that it constitutes an incorporation of a
document (the HUD or VA regulation) that is not part of the note it-
self.66 This is said to run counter to U.C.C. Article 3,67 which provides
that the note is regarded conditional if “rights or obligations with re-
spect to the promise or order are stated in another writing.”68
This argument is likely incorrect for two reasons. First, the leg-
end inserted into the FHA note deals expressly with the power to
accelerate the loan; it limits the lender’s right to accelerate without
first following the loss mitigation procedures spelled out in the applica-
ble HUD regulations. However, under U.C.C. Section 3-106, a
negotiable note may contain a reference to another document “for a
statement of rights with respect to collateral, prepayment, or accelera-
tion.”69 Thus, there is no objection to referring to the regulations for
limitations on acceleration. Whether this same reasoning would apply
to the VA legend is more debatable, since it is not limited to the context
of acceleration, but rather provides more broadly that the VA’s regula-
tions “shall govern the rights, duties, and liabilities of the parties to
such loan.”70
The second reason that the argument for nonnegotiability of the
FHA and VA note forms seems likely to fail is that their added legends
are merely truisms and do not change the meaning of the notes at all.
In substance, they say that applicable federal regulations govern the
enforcement of the notes. But the truth of that statement is obvious,
http://benefits.va.gov/WARMS/docs/admin26/pamphlet/pam26_7/Chap_9_April_2012_with_
info_mapping.pdf (listing clauses that are required in the note, but making no reference to
the language quoted above).
66. See Message of April Charney, legal services attorney, to DIRT listserve, Feb. 15,
2015 (arguing VA notes are nonnegotiable); Message of Richard F. Kohn to DIRT listserve,
Feb. 14, 2015 (on file with author) (arguing FHA notes are nonnegotiable).
67. U.C.C. § 3-106(a)(ii). See Guniganti v. Kalvakuntla, 346 S.W.3d 242 (Tex. App.
2011) (stating that a note incorporating reference to guaranty was nonnegotiable); Hol-
sonback v. First State Bank, 394 So. 2d 381 (Ala. Civ. App. 1980) (holding note “subject to
terms of a contract of purchase” was nonnegotiable).
68. U.C.C. § 3-106(a)(iii). According to Official Comment 1“the holder of a negotiable
instrument should not be required to examine another document to determine rights with
respect to payment.” HUD does not seem quite willing to commit itself with respect to the
negotiability of the note as modified by FHA’s requirements. Its handbook states, “[t]he note
must be a negotiable instrument. The Model Note Form has not been reviewed for compli-
ance with all state laws, which could affect negotiability.” HUD HANDBOOK 4155-2,
LENDER’S GUIDE TO THE SINGLE FAMILY MORTGAGE INSURANCE PROCESS, § 4155.2(6)(B)(3)(b),
http://portal.hud.gov/hudportal/documents/huddoc?id=41552HSGH.pdf.
69. U.C.C. § 3-106(b) (1990 rev.). See Mesina v. Citibank, 2012 WL 2501123 (Bankr.
D.N.J. 2012) (relating that reference in note to provisions of mortgage relating to accelera-
tion and prepayment did not impair note’s negotiability).
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and it would be equally true if the legends were not included in the
notes. Because the legends add nothing to the legal meaning of the
notes, they would probably be disregarded by the courts and treated as
having no effect on negotiability.71 Moreover, they do not violate the
policy against incorporation of external documents into negotiable
notes, because here the document being incorporated is not in private
hands, but is a public regulation, available for all to see.
In sum, it seems likely, though not certain, that the standard
Fannie Mae-Freddie Mac one-to-four-family residential note, including
its variations for FHA and VA loans, is negotiable. On the other hand,
when one considers notes used for commercial mortgage loans the
question is much more open and fact-specific. There are plenty of ways
that such a commercial note might be made nonnegotiable. For exam-
ple, the note might contain a clause incorporating by reference all of
the other loan documents (which might include a mortgage, a loan
agreement, a guaranty of payment, an environmental indemnity, and
perhaps several other documents). Such provisions are not unusual in
commercial mortgage notes, and will surely destroy negotiability.72
The drafter might insert other conditions or promises beyond the
promise to pay money.73 The note might contain a promise by the
lender to make, and the borrower to repay, additional but unspecified
advances in the future.74 The method of calculation of interest might
be stated in ambiguous or conflicting terms, making it impossible to
determine the amount due.75 The note might provide for repayment of
71. I am indebted to Prof. Neil Cohen of Brooklyn Law School for pointing out this
argument. But see Bankers Trust (Delaware) v. 236 Beltway Inv., 865 F. Supp. 1186, 1193
(E.D. Va. 1994) (revealing the promissory note contained a clause providing that the parties
could modify the note’s interest rate in the future by mutual agreement and  concluding
that this provision prevented the note from stating a “sum certain” to be paid, and hence
made it nonnegotiable). Since any note can always be modified by mutual agreement, the
added language about future renegotiation made no meaningful change in the rights of the
parties, and it should have been disregarded by the court. The opinion’s reasoning is bi-
zarre. See also N. Bank v. Pefferoni Pizza Co., 555 N.W. 2d 338, 342-45 (Neb. App. 1996)
aff’d, 562 N.W. 2d 374 (Neb.1997) (showing that this opinion seems to make the same error,
although the terms of the renegotiation clause were not as clear).
72. See U.C.C. § 3-106(a)(iii); Growth Equities Corp. v. Freed, 1991 WL 10200 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1991) (stating note reciting that it was “subject to” partnership agreement was non-
negotiable); Jackson v. Luellen Farms, Inc., 877 N.E. 2d 848, 853-54 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007)
(holding a note incorporating terms of mortgage was nonnegotiable).
73. DBA Enters. v. Findlay, 923 P.2d 298 (Colo. App. 1996) (stating a note that incor-
porated covenant not to compete was nonnegotiable).
74. See Nat’l City Bank v. Victor Bldg. Co., 2000 WL 1545096 (Ohio Ct. App. 2000)
(explaining that the promise to make additional advances was in a separate agreement and
hence did not render the note nonnegotiable).
75. See DH Cattle Holdings Co. v. Reinoso, 575 N.Y.S. 2d 203, 204 (1991); Sheppard v.
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a fluctuating line of credit.76 The drafter might even be so careless as
to omit the word “order” from the clause specifying to whom payment is
to be made.
Thus, there are manifold ways of making a note nonnegotiable.
None of the examples mentioned in the previous paragraph is particu-
larly rare or unusual. They illustrate that the difference between
negotiable and nonnegotiable notes can be subtle, complex, and diffi-
cult to determine, and that failure of negotiability can occur for many
potential reasons. Hence, they make it amply clear that our inquiry
here – how can nonnegotiable notes be transferred – is important and
worthy of our consideration and analysis.
III. WHAT IS A TRANSFER?
The concept of transfer of a promissory note turns out to be
more nuanced than many (including many lawyers) recognize. The rea-
son is that, under the modern Uniform Commercial Code, there are
two distinct sets of rights in a note that can be transferred.77 One set of
rights, commonly termed “PETE status,” refers to the right to enforce
the note; “PETE” is an acronym for “person entitled to enforce,” a term
used by UCC Section 3-301.78 The transfer of PETE status is governed
by Article 3, but only if the note is negotiable.79 Hence, the discussion
in Part II above concerning the distinction between negotiable and
nonnegotiable notes is of critical importance in determining whether
Article 3 will apply. If Article 3 is inapplicable, the transfer of PETE
status is governed by common law principles, to be discussed in the
next part of this article.
The other set of rights, usually termed “ownership” of the note,
is governed by UCC Article 9 regardless of whether the note is negotia-
160 (S.D.N.Y. 1992) (holding the method of computing interest was sufficiently clearly
stated).
76. Yin v. Soc’y Nat’l Bank Indiana, 665 N.E. 2d 58, 62 (Ind. Ct. App. 1996).
77. See PERMANENT EDITORIAL BOARD FOR THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE, APPLICA-
TION OF THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE TO SELECTED ISSUES RELATING TO MORTGAGE
NOTES 8 (Nov. 14, 2011), http://www.uniformlaws.org/Shared/Committees_Materials/PEB
UCC/PEB_Report_111411.pdf [hereinafter PEB report].
78. U.C.C. § 3-301 (2002).
79. This follows from U.C.C. § 3-104(b) (“ ‘Instrument’ means a negotiable instru-
ment.”). It is clear that Article 3 applies to negotiable notes even if they are secured by
mortgages or other real estate security devices. See First Valley Bank v. First Sav. & Loan
Ass’n, 412 N.E. 2d 1237 (Ind. App. 1980); Best Fertilizers of Arizona, Inc. v. Burns, 570 P.
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ble.80 Ownership refers to the right to economic benefits of the note,
and includes monthly payments, the proceeds of a voluntary payoff or
short sale, and foreclosure proceeds.81 The significance of ownership
brings to mind the well-known political aphorism “follow the money,”
for it is to the owner of the note that the money flows.
The significance of these two sets of rights, ownership and
PETE status, is sharply distinct. PETE status refers to a relationship
with the maker of the note—the borrower. Thus, a borrower can nego-
tiate with the party having PETE status to modify the loan, accept a
payoff for less than the face amount owed, or approve a “short sale” or
a deed in lieu of foreclosure, and be assured that any agreement
reached with the PETE in any of these negotiations will be binding.
On the other hand, the borrower is typically unconcerned with the
identity or separate existence of the owner—the party to whom the
proceeds of the loan will ultimately be paid.82 If the borrower pays the
PETE, the borrower’s obligation is satisfied. The borrower has no re-
sponsibility for ensuring that the money will get to the owner of the
note. One court put it this way:
[T]he rules that determine who is entitled to enforce a note are con-
cerned primarily with the maker of the note. They are designed to
provide for the maker a relatively simple way of determining to
whom the obligation is owed and, thus, whom the maker must pay
in order to avoid defaulting on the obligation. U.C.C. § 3–602(a), (c).
By contrast, the rules concerning transfer of ownership and other
interests in a note identify who, among competing claimants, is en-
titled to the note’s economic value (that is, the value of the maker’s
promise to pay). Under established rules, the maker should be in-
different as to who owns or has an interest in the note so long as it
does not affect the maker’s ability to make payments on the note.
Or, to put this statement in the context of this case, the [borrowers]
should not care who actually owns the Note—and it is thus irrele-
vant whether the Note has been fractionalized or securitized—so
long as they do know who they should pay.83
80. U.C.C. § 9-203(b) (providing that a security interest is enforceable only if the trans-
feree gives value, the transferor holds the rights being transferred, and there is either a
written agreement of transfer or a delivery of possession of the note to the transferee). See
Morgan v. Farmers & Merchants Bank, 856 So. 2d 811, 825-26 (Ala. 2003) (holding that a
nonnegotiable note may be considered an “instrument” for purposes of Article 9 so that a
security interest in it could be perfected by possession).
81. See Dale Whitman, “THE PERSON ENTITLED TO ENFORCE:” LESSONS LEARNED FROM
BAC HOME LOANS SERVICING V. KOLENICH, ABA REAL PROP. NEWS, Dec. 2012, at 1.
82. See, e.g., In re Sia, 2013 WL 4547312 (Bankr. D.N.J. 2013) (showing holder of note
can enforce it even if it is not the owner; ownership is irrelevant to the right to enforce and
identity of owner is of no importance to maker of note).
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The notion that ownership of the note and the right to enforce it
are separate and distinct rights that may be held by different parties84
is a modern idea. No clue to the distinction appeared in the old Negoti-
able Instruments Law, which spoke of transfers of title, did not identify
the right to enforce as a separate right, and apparently assumed that
ownership of title and the right to enforce were unitary.85
The distinction drawn in the Code between owning a note and
being entitled to enforce it may initially seem artificial or confusing,
but it is actually quite useful. In the context of outright purchases of
mortgage loans, the buyer invariably wants both ownership and the
right of enforcement. However, there are good reasons that the buyer
may subsequently want to split the two rights. It is common for the
owner of the note to designate a servicer to collect monthly payments,
maintain payment records, maintain and make disbursements from
tax and insurance escrow accounts, modify the loan’s terms if needed,
and pursue foreclosure if the borrower defaults and is unable to cure. If
foreclosure is necessary, many jurisdictions will allow the servicer to
proceed as an agent for the owner of the loan. But a few states require
the foreclosure action to be pursued by the “real party in interest”
rather than an agent,86 and in other states the owner of the loan may
prefer to have the servicer proceed in its own name for administrative
or public relations purposes. To accomplish this, the loan’s buyer may
retain ownership but transfer the right of enforcement to its servicer.
For example, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac routinely deliver the note
to the servicer in order to enable the servicer to foreclose in its own
name as holder of the note. Yet, obviously, the proceeds of the foreclo-
sure are intended to flow, by the terms of the servicing agreement,
back to Fannie or Freddie. Thus, Fannie or Freddie remains the owner
of the note, while the servicer becomes the PETE – the person entitled
to enforce.87
84. See Bank of America v. Inda, 303 P. 3d 696 (Kan. App. 2013).
85. See, e.g., N.I.L., supra note 13, at § 51 (“Where the holder of an instrument payable
to his order transfers it for value without indorsing it, the transfer vests in the transferee
such title as the transferer had therein . . . .”); § 57 (“The title of a person who negotiates an
instrument is defective within the meaning of this act when he obtained the instrument (by
fraud or other unlawful means, etc.)”). See also N.I.L., supra note 13, at §§ 61, 67 (referring
to title).
86. See, e.g., U.S. Bank Nat’l Ass’n. v. Marcino, 908 N.E. 2d 1032, 1036 (Ohio Ct. App.
2009); Wells Fargo Bank v. Lupori, 8 A.3d 919, 922 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2010). Cases on this
point often fail to distinguish accurately between ownership and the right to enforce the
note.
87. This process is aptly described in Giles v. Wells Fargo Bank, 519 Fed. Appx. 576
(11th Cir. 2013); J.E. Robert Co. v. Signature Props., LLC, 71 A.3d 492 (Conn. 2013); Bank
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A. Transferring the Right of Enforcement (PETE Status)
The distinction between the two sets of rights, ownership and
enforcement, arises from the peculiar structure of current U.C.C. Arti-
cles 3 and 9. Article 3 deals with the right of enforcement. Under
Article 3, the person entitled to enforce (i.e., the PETE) is defined as
either the holder of the instrument or a nonholder in possession of the
instrument who has the rights of a holder.88 To be a holder, a person
must be in possession of the note, and either (i) the note must be paya-
ble to that person (because the person was the original payee or
because the note has been indorsed to that person) or (ii) the note must
be payable to bearer (because it was originally payable to bearer89 or
because it has been indorsed in blank by a previous holder).90 To be a
“nonholder with the rights of a holder,” a person must be in possession
of the note, but it need not have been indorsed to the person. However,
the person seeking to enforce it must show that it was “delivered . . . for
the purpose of giving to the person receiving delivery the right to en-
force the instrument.”91 These definitions may seem dense, but the
(Md. 2013) (showing that the court was highly critical of this practice in JP Morgan Chase
Bank v. Butler, 2013 WL 3359283 (Table) (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2013) (describing it as deceptive
and as a way for the owner of the note to evade its responsibility to be identified as the
foreclosure plaintiff. The criticism seems overwrought; the holder is simply taking advan-
tage of the principles set out in UCC Article 3)).
88. U.C.C. § 3-301.
89. No endorsement is necessary if the note was originally payable to “bearer.” See
Bank of New York v. Raftogianis, 10 A.3d 236, 240 (N.J. Super. Ch. Div. 2010). But bearer
notes are virtually never used in real estate financing.
90. U.C.C. § 1-201(b)(21)(A). See PEB Report, supra note 77, at 5.
91. U.C.C. § 3-203. See PEB Report, supra note 77, at 5-6; U.S. Bank v. Squadron VCD,
LLC, 504 Fed. Appx. 30 (2d Cir. 2012) (finding note and mortgage enforceable even if en-
dorsement was absent or improper); Robinson v. H & R Block Bank, 2013 WL 2356106
(E.D.N.Y. 2013) (same); Veal v. Am. Home Mortg. Servicing, Inc. (In re Veal), 450 B.R. 897,
911-12 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2011) (recognizing “nonholder with the rights of a holder” status, but
finding that it did not exist in the absence of possession of note); Aum Shree of Tampa v.
HSBC Bank USA (In re Aum Shree of Tampa, LLC), 449 B.R. 584, 593-94 (Bankr. M.D. Fla.
2011) (showing where foreclosing party proved possession of the note, it was at least a
nonholder with the rights of a holder; it was not required to prove that it was a holder in due
course); In re Wilhelm, 407 B.R. 392 (Bankr. D. Idaho 2009) (moving creditors were not
“nonholders in possession of the instrument with rights of a holder” because they did not
prove actual possession of the notes); J.E. Robert Co. v. Signature Props., LLC, 71 A.3d 492
(Conn. 2013) (finding note was delivered to servicer with intent to transfer right of enforce-
ment); Ulster Sav. Bank v. 28 Brynwood Lane, 41 A.3d 1077, 1085 (Conn. App. 2013)
(assignment and affidavits proved note was delivered to transfer right of enforcement);
Miller v. Kondaur Capital Corp., 91 So. 3d 218 (Fla. App. 2012); Anderson v. Burson, 9 A.3d
870 (Md. App. 2010), aff’d 35 A.3d 452 (Md. 2011) (permitting enforcement where possessor
of unendorsed note did not prove each prior transfer, but makers conceded that such trans-
fers had occurred); Wells Fargo Bank v. Ford, 15 A.3d 327, 331 (N.J. Super. App. Div. 2011)
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central point needed to be drawn from them is simple: the right to en-
force a negotiable note can be transferred only by delivery of possession
of the note itself. If the note has been properly indorsed to the person
seeking to enforce it, that person’s burden of proof is simpler, since
without appropriate indorsements she or he may be put to the neces-
sity of proving the purpose for which delivery was made to him or her.
But either way, possession is the touchstone.92
Why does the law make possession critical? Because possession
by the person seeking payment provides proof to the maker of the note
that she or he is paying the right person. In theory, the borrower can
demand to see the note before making payment, and can by this means
verify that payment is being made to the PETE.93 Of course, borrowers
rarely demand production of the note, even when making a final payoff
of the loan, but the right to make such a demand exists, and borrowers’
counsel has exercised it fairly frequently in recent years in litigation
attempting to defend foreclosures.94
Because ordinarily only one person can have possession of a
note at any given time, the requirement that a PETE have possession
acts as a mechanism to assure borrowers that they are dealing with
the right party. This mechanism can be thought of as analogous to title
assurance in real estate sale transactions. In an era when mass secon-
dary market sales of mortgage notes are extremely common, some such
mechanism is essential if the market is not to degenerate into chaos.
There is, after all, no alternative form of assurance available to bor-
ticated); Bank of New York v. Raftogianis, 13 A.3d 435, 450 (N.J.  Super. Ch. Div. 2010)
(possession of note required in order to be a nonholder with the rights of a holder); Wells
Fargo Bank v. Freed, 2012 WL 6562819 (Ohio App. 2012) (not reported in N.E.2d); Bank of
America v. Kabba, 276 P.3d 1006, 1009 (Okla. 2012) (“Delivery of the note would still have
to occur even though there is no negotiation.”). But cf. In re Adams, 693 S.E.2d 705 (N.C.
App. 2010) (refusing to allow foreclosure by the party in possession of the note, apparently
because it was not endorsed).
92. U.C.C. § 3-309(a)(3). An exception exists if the note has been “destroyed, its where-
abouts cannot be determined, or it is in the wrongful possession of an unknown person or a
person that cannot be found or is not amenable to service of process.” The person seeking to
enforce the note must still prove its terms and the right to enforce it, but obviously cannot
and need not show possession of the original note. See § 3-309(b).
93. Indeed, if the note has been lost or destroyed and the person enforcing it employs
the procedure outlined in U.C.C. § 3-309, the court may require “adequate protection,” typi-
cally by a bond or indemnity, against the possibility that someone else may in fact have
possession and may attempt to enforce the note. See U.C.C. § 3-309(b); Secy. of Veterans
Affairs v. Leonhardt, 29 N.E.3d 1, 1 (Ohio Ct. App. 2015) (showing that no bond or indem-
nity required where VA had possession when the note was lost, had not transferred it to
anyone else, and no other claimant had come forward in the five years since the note was
lost).
94. See, e.g., Murray v. HSBC Bank USA, 157 So. 3d 355, 356 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
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rowers. They cannot rely on the real estate recording system, the
U.C.C. Article 9 financing statement records,95 or any other existing
system of records, for none of these govern the right to enforce promis-
sory notes.
In light of the importance of possession in establishing PETE
status, it is strange that possession was often treated in such a cavalier
manner by secondary market investors during the heated era that pre-
ceded the 2007 collapse of the mortgage market.96 Failure to get
possession of the note, or to get it in a timely manner, was surprisingly
common.97 Indeed, there were reports of originators shredding or oth-
erwise destroying original notes, so that it became impossible to
transfer their possession.98 It is hard to imagine the lack of basic un-
derstanding of Article 3 that must have accompanied such actions.
Before leaving Article 3 and PETE status, one additional point
must be made. In the great majority of U.S. jurisdictions, whoever has
PETE status also has the right to foreclose the mortgage or other land
security device that accompanies the note. This principle, often stated
as “the mortgage follows the note,” is at least 200 years old.99 The pay-
ment obligation is regarded as the principal thing being transferred,
95. The Article 9 filing system is helpful to parties taking security interests in promis-
sory notes, but it is of no value to borrowers in determining the identity of the PETE.
96. For a recounting of the collapse, see Lisa Prevost, A Decline in Problem Mortgages,
N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 2, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/01/04/realestate/a-decline-in-prob-
lem-mortgages.html.
97. See Gretchen Morgenson, If Lenders Say ‘The Dog Ate Your Mortgage’, N.Y. TIMES
(Oct. 24, 2009), http://www.nytimes.com/2009/10/25/business/economy/25gret.html.
98. For example, a letter to the Florida Supreme Court from the Florida Bankers Asso-
ciation in 2009 observed, “The reason ‘many firms file lost note counts as a standard
alternative pleading in the complaint’ is because the physical document was deliberately
eliminated to avoid confusion immediately upon its conversion to an electronic file.” Yves
Smith, FUBAR Mortgage Behavior: Florida Banks Destroyed Notes; Others Never Trans-
ferred Them, NAKED CAPITALISM (Sept. 27, 2010), http://www.nakedcapitalism.com/
2010/09/more-evidence-of-bank-fubar-mortgage-behavior-florida-banks-destroyed-notes-
others-never-transferred-them.html (revealing that it is not clear how many notes were in-
tentionally destroyed, but it seems obvious that in many cases the lost note affidavit process
was employed simply to avoid the trouble of looking for the note). One Florida legal aid
attorney estimated that eighty percent of the foreclosure complaints in his locality were
accompanied by lost note affidavits. Bob Ivry, Banks Lose to Deadbeat Homeowners as
Loans Sold in Bonds Vanish, BLOOMBERG (Feb. 22, 2008), www.bloomberg.com/apps/
news?pid=newsarchive & sid=aejJZdqodTCM.
99. The classic statement is depicted in Carpenter v. Longan, 83 U.S. 271 (1872). See
Green v. Hart, 1 Johns. Cas. 580 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1806). In perhaps a dozen states, this princi-
ple is not followed in nonjudicial foreclosure proceedings, and some other mechanism
(typically a mortgage assignment) is necessary to transfer the right of nonjudicial foreclo-
sure. See Dale A. Whitman & Drew Milner, Foreclosing on Nothing: The Curious Problem of
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with the interest in the land automatically attached to it in an ex-
tremely important, but subsidiary, capacity.100 Hence, no separate
assignment of the mortgage is needed to confer the right to foreclose.
This notion is of fundamental importance. It means that, ordinarily,
whoever can establish a claim to the obligation automatically gets with
it the security interest in the land, provided it is still in existence.101
100. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROPERTY: MORTGAGES § 5.4 (1997). The classic statement
is seen in Carpenter v. Longan, 83 U.S. 271 (1872) (“All the authorities agree that the debt
is the principal thing and the mortgage an accessory.”). See In re Vargas, 396 B.R. 511, 516-
17 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 2008); First Nat’l Bank v. Larson, 17 B.R. 957, 965 (Bankr. D.N.J.
1982); Yanfag v. Cyfred, Ltd., 2009 WL 5214891 (Guam Terr. Dec. 9, 2009); Goetz v. Selsor,
628 S.W.2d 404 (Mo. Ct. App. 1982); Fidelity & Deposit Co. v. Ticor Title Ins. Co., 943 P.2d
710 (Wash. Ct. App. 1997); ELLIS & LOWRY, A COMPREHENSIVE NOTE PURCHASE GUIDE (WITH
FORMS), PART I, PRAC. REAL ESTATE LAW 45 (1987); ELLIS & LOWRY, A COMPREHENSIVE NOTE
PURCHASE GUIDE (WITH FORMS), PART II, PRAC. REAL ESTATE LAW 49 (Sept. 1987); Antonio
R. Bautista & Frank R. Kennedy, The Imputed Negotiability of Security Interests Under the
Code, 38 IND. L.J. 574 (1963); Swigert, Note, Transfer of the Mortgagee’s Interest in Florida,
14 U. FLA. L. REV. 98 (1961). Likewise, if the note has been fully paid, the mortgage is a
nullity and an assignment of it is meaningless. See Burkhardt v. Bailey, 680 N.W.2d 453
(Mich. Ct. App. 2004).
101. Horvath v. Bank of New York, 641 F.3d 617, 623 (4th Cir. 2011) (wherein “a trans-
fer of a secured debt carries with it the security without formal assignment or delivery”);
UMLIC VP LLC v. Matthias, 234 F. Supp. 2d 520 (D.V.I. 2002), aff’d, 364 F.3d 125 (3d Cir.
2004) (noting a transfer of note automatically carries mortgage with it, even if transferee is
unaware that the note is secured); Roisland v. Flagstar Bank, 989 F. Supp. 2d 1095 (D. Or.
2013) (showing transfer of note to new holder automatically assigned deed of trust, without
formal assignment); In re Bryant, 452 B.R. 876, 880 (Bankr. S.D. Ga. 2011) (under South
Carolina law, “the assignment of a note secured by a mortgage carries with it an assignment
of the mortgage”); U.S. Bank v. McConnell, 305 P.3d 1 (Kan. Ct. App. 2013); In re Gemini
Services, Inc., 350 B.R. 74 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 2006) (beneficial interest in mortgage went to
secondary market investor to whom note was delivered, although mortgage was assigned to
MERS); Domarad v. Fisher & Burke, Inc., 76 Cal. Rptr. 529 (Cal. Ct. App. 1969); Columbus
Invs. v. Lewis, 48 P.3d 1222 (Colo. 2002); J.E. Robert Co. v. Signature Props., LLC, 71 A.3d
492 (Conn. 2013); Margiewicz v. Terco Props., 441 So. 2d 1124 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983);
Fed. Nat’l Mortg. Ass’n v. Kuipers, 732 N.E.2d 723 (Ill. Ct. App. 2000); Moore v. Lewis, 366
N.E.2d 594 (Ill. Ct. App. 1977); Bank of America v. Inda, 303 P.3d 696 (Kan. Ct. App. 2013);
Svrcek v. Rosenberg, 40 A.3d 494, 507-08 (Md. 2012); Deutsche Bank v. Codio, 943 N.Y.S.2d
545, 546 (N.Y. App. Div. 2012) (“[A] written assignment of the underlying note . . . is suffi-
cient to transfer the obligation, and the mortgage passes with the debt as an inseparable
incident.”); Deutsche Bank v. Pietranico, 928 N.Y.S.2d 818 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2011) (“[A]s the
note changes hands, the mortgage remains connected to it legally even though it is not
physically attached.”); Cent. Mortg. Co. v. Webster, 978 N.E.2d 962, 968 (Ohio Ct. App.
2012); Bank of America v. Draper, 746 S.E.2d 478 (S.C. Ct. App. 2013); Commonwealth
Prop. Advocates, LLC v. Mortg. Electronic Registration Sys., Inc., 263 P.3d 397 (Utah Ct.
App. 2011); Fidelity & Deposit Co. v. Ticor Title Ins. Co., 943 P.2d 710 (Wash. Ct. App.
1997); Dow Family, LLC v. PHH Mortg. Corp., 838 N.W.2d 411 (Wis. Ct. App. 2013). See
generally Deborah L. Thorne & Ethel Hong Badawi, Does “the Mortgage Follow the Note”?:
Lessons Learned, Best Practices for Assignment of a Note and Mortgage, AM. BANKR. INST. J.
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This principle is simple enough when PETE status and owner-
ship of the note are regarded as unitary. Now that it is recognized that
they can be separated, the question arises: With which set of rights
(enforcement or ownership) does the mortgage run? A complete discus-
sion of this issue will have to wait until the completion of this paper’s
consideration of transfers of ownership, but at this point a narrower
question can be answered: Which set of rights – enforcement or owner-
ship – carries with it the right to foreclose the mortgage? Most of the
older judicial opinions do not recognize or understand the distinction
between ownership and PETE status, and hence are useless in resolv-
ing this issue, and this is sometimes true with modern case opinions as
well.102 In recent years, however, a number of courts have addressed
the question knowledgably, and their answers are consistent: PETE
status, and not ownership per se, confers the right to foreclose the
mortgage.103 In other words, the right to enforce the mortgage follows
102. Some older cases recognize the point. In 1923, the Oklahoma Supreme Court noted
that “the mortgage securing the payment of a note is merely an incident and accessory to it,
and the indorsement and delivery of a note carries with it the mortgage without any formal
assignment thereof.”  Chase v. Commerce Trust Co., 224 P. 148, 149 (Okla. 1923). On the
other hand, modern decisions sometimes continue to confuse the concepts of PETE and own-
ership. See, e.g., U.S. Bank v. McConnell, 305 P.3d 1 (Kan. Ct. App. 2013) (perpetuating the
long-time Kansas muddling of the two terms); Servedio v. U.S. Bank, 40 So. 2d 1105 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 2010); Deutsche Bank v. Mitchell, 27 A.3d 1229 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.
2011) (“[A] party seeking to foreclose a mortgage must own or control the underlying debt”);
U.S. Bank v. Kimball, 27 A.3d 1087, 1092 (Vt. 2011) (“[T]o foreclose a mortgage, a plaintiff
must demonstrate that it has a right to enforce the note, and without such ownership, the
plaintiff lacks standing.”).
103. The decisions often use the term “holder” as synonymous with PETE, although, as
we have already seen, being a holder is only one way of being a PETE. See J.E. Robert Co. v.
Signature Props., LLC, 71 A.3d 492 (Conn. 2013) (showing that “to enforce a note, one need
not be the owner of the note”); BAC Home Loans Servicing, LP v. Kolenich, No. CA2012-01-
001, slip op. at 6 (Ohio Ct. App. Oct. 29, 2012) (“The current holder of the note and mortgage
is entitled to bring a foreclosure action against a defaulting mortgagor even if the current
holder is not the owner of the note and mortgage.”); Edelstein v. Bank of New York Mellon,
286 P.3d 249, 257 (Nev. 2012) (“Indeed, to foreclose, one must be able to enforce both the
promissory note and the deed of trust. Under the traditional rule, entitlement to enforce the
promissory note would be sufficient to foreclose . . .”) (citation omitted)). See also In re
Tikhonov, BAP No. CC 11-1698-MKBePa, slip op. at 7-8 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. Dec. 14, 2012)
(explaining that a party must show it is the holder of the note in order to have standing to
seek relief from an automatic stay of foreclosure in bankruptcy); Roisland v. Flagstar Bank,
989 F. Supp. 2d 1095 (D. Or. 2013) (showing that under Oregon law, holder of note automat-
ically became holder of deed of trust and could appoint successor trustee to commence
nonjudicial foreclosure); In re Martinez, 455 B.R. 735 (Bankr. D. Kan. 2011) (Kansas law
stating that “the holder of an instrument whether or not he is the owner may enforce pay-
ment in his own name” and hence may foreclose); U.S. Bank v. Thomes, 69 A.3d 411 (Me.
2013) (foreclosing party must show entitlement to enforce the note if it is not the note’s
owner); In re Kemp, 440 B.R. 624 (Bankr. D.N.J. 2010) (showing a party seeking foreclosure,
though owner of note, cannot enforce it without possession); Nelson v. Fed. Nat’l Mortg.
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entitlement to enforce the note, not its ownership. This result is per-
fectly sensible, since foreclosure is simply one way for a creditor to
realize payment of the debt that the note represents. Any payment re-
ceived by virtue of the foreclosure must be applied against the balance
owed on the note, and if foreclosure results in payment in full, the note
is discharged.104 Hence, to view the power to foreclose the mortgage as
dependent on a creditor’s right to enforce the note – or PETE status –
is entirely logical.
property that is the subject of a mortgage securing that debt if the owner is the holder of the
promissory note at the time the owner initiates foreclosure proceedings.”); Wells Fargo
Bank v. Morcom, 125 So. 3d 320 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2013) (“[T]he person having standing to
foreclose a note secured by a mortgage may be either the holder of the note or a nonholder in
possession of the note who has the rights of a holder.”); Bank of America v. Inda, 303 P.3d
696 (Kan. Ct. App. 2013) (holding that “because [servicer] was the holder of the Note, [ser-
vicer] was also the holder of the Mortgage”); Bank of America v. Cloutier, 61 A.3d 1242 (Me.
2013) (“[A] foreclosure plaintiff [must] identify the owner or economic beneficiary and, if it is
not itself the owner, prove that it has power to enforce the note.”); Deutsche Bank v. Brock,
63 A.3d 40 (Md. 2013) (indicating that a party entitled to enforce note is also entitled to
foreclose deed of trust); Eaton v. Fed. Nat’l Mortg. Ass’n, 969 N.E.2d 1118, 1129 (Mass.
2012) (“[W]e construe the term ‘mortgagee’ in [the foreclosure statute] to mean a mortgagee
who also holds the underlying mortgage note.”); U.S. Bank v. Burns, 406 S.W.3d 495 (Mo.
Ct. App. 2013) (The court concluded that the facts “qualify U.S. Bank as the holder of the
Note under the UCC . . . . As such, U.S. Bank is . . . therefore entitled to enforce the Deed of
Trust.”); Bank of America v. Limato, 2012 WL 2505725 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2012) (not
reported in A.3d) (foreclosing party provided insufficient proof of entitlement to enforce
note); Bank of New York Mellon v. Deane, 970 N.Y.S.2d 427 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2013); CPT Asset
Backed Certificates v. Cin Kham, 278 P.3d 586, 591 (Okl. 2012) (“To commence a foreclosure
action in Oklahoma, a plaintiff must demonstrate it has a right to enforce the note . . . .”);
Niday v. GMAC Mortg., LLC, 302 P.3d  444 (Or. 2013) (agreeing in dictum with this conclu-
sion); JP Morgan Chase Bank v. Murray, 63 A.3d 1258 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2013); Bank of
America v. Draper, 746 S.E.2d 478 (2013); Wells Fargo Bank Minnesota v. Rouleau, 46 A.3d
905 (Vt. 2012); Bain v. Metro. Mortg. Group, 285 P.3d 34, 44 (Wash. 2012) (relying on the
definition of PETE in U.C.C. § 3-301). Some courts were evidently slightly confused. See
RMS Residential Props., LLC v. Miller, 32 A.3d 307 (Conn. 2011) (holder of note is pre-
sumed to be owner of debt, and unless the presumption is rebutted, has standing to
foreclose). But see JPMorgan Chase Bank v. Erlandson, 821 N.W.2d 600 (Minn. Ct. App.
2012) (a bizarre holding that proof of the right to enforce the note is not necessary, even to
pursue a judicial foreclosure). If the plaintiff does not have possession of the note when the
foreclosure proceeding is commenced, but subsequently acquires it prior to judgment, is its
lack of initial standing cured, or must it file a new action? There is little clear authority on
the point. See Focht v. Wells Fargo Bank, 124 So. 3d 308 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2013) (certify-
ing this issue for review to the Florida Supreme Court). The New York view requires
possession (or a mortgage assignment) at the time of filing. See Mark C. Dillon, Unsettled
Times Make Well-Settled Law: Recent Developments in New York State’s Residential Mort-
gage Foreclosure Statutes and Case Law, 76 ALB. L. REV. 1085, 1092-94 (2013).
104. PEB Report, supra note 77, at 4 (“(1) [T]he maker’s obligation on the note is to pay
the amount of the note to the person entitled to enforce the note; (2) the maker’s payment to
the person entitled to enforce the note results in discharge of the maker’s obligation; and (3)
the maker’s failure to pay, when due, the amount of the note to the person entitled to enforce
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B. Transferring Ownership
As we will see, U.C.C. Article 9 governs ownership of notes as
well as security interests in ownership rights. It plainly applies to all
mortgage notes, regardless of whether they are negotiable,105 but for
the moment we will focus our analysis on negotiable notes – those cov-
ered by Articles 3 and 9. The original Article 9 covered the creation of
security interests in notes, along with many other forms of personal
property.106 But the 1998 revision of Article 9 made a radical change;
for the first time, outright sales of notes were also covered.107 This
change was highly significant and took many lawyers unaware because
of the complex language in which it was couched.108 The following par-
agraph examines that language.
Article 9’s scope statement provides that “this article applies to
. . . a sale of . . . promissory notes.”109 The U.C.C.’s overall definitions
section provides that “Security interest” includes “any interest of . . . a
buyer of . . . a promissory note in a transaction that is subject to Article
9.”110 Thus, the right of a note buyer – what in ordinary parlance we
would call “title” or “ownership” – is a “security interest” in Article 9
terminology. Article 9 then provides that a security interest “attaches”
(that is, ownership passes to the buyer in the case of an outright sale)
when the security interest becomes enforceable against the “debtor” –
that is, the transferor. Article 9 then goes on to prescribe the methods
105. Article 9 uses the term “instrument,” defined in U.C.C. § 9-102(a)(47) as a docu-
ment of a “type that in ordinary business is transferred by delivery with any necessary
indorsement or assignment.” This definition covers all promissory notes, irrespective of
their negotiability. See Morgan v. Farmers & Merchants Bank, 856 So. 2d 811, 818 (Ala.
2003); McFarland v. Brier, 850 A.2d 965, 976 (R.I. 2004) (discussing whether a certificate of
deposit that is, by its terms, nontransferable is thereby disqualified from being an “instru-
ment” under Article 9).
106. See, e.g., In re Southern Oregon Mortg. Co., 125 B.R. 625 (Bankr. D. Or. 1991).
107. Further amendments to Article 9 were adopted in 2010, but they are mainly techni-
cal in nature and do not affect the issues under consideration here.
108. An outright sale of a note is, rather confusingly, termed the creation of a “security
interest” by Article 9 – a sort of definitional leftover from the days when the Article applied
only to actual security interests. Similarly, in an outright transfer, the transferor is known
as the “debtor,” the transferee is called the “secured party,” and the rights transferred are
termed “the collateral.” See U.C.C. § 9-102(a)(28)(B) (2012) (defining “debtor”); § 9-
102(a)(72)(D) (defining “secured party”). The rights transferred may be full ownership or
some lesser ownership interest, such as a security or collateral interest, provided that the
transferor “has rights in the collateral or the power to transfer rights in the collateral to a
secured party.” UCC § 9-203(b)(2).
109. U.C.C. § 9-109(a)(3). See Dale Whitman, Transfers of Mortgage Notes Under New
Article 9, http://dirt.umkc.edu/files/newart9i.htm (last visited Oct. 24, 2015).
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by which the security interest will become enforceable.111 Thus, “at-
tachment” of a “security interest” against a “debtor” becomes a proxy
for the plain English phrase, “sale of ownership rights.” The termino-
logical complexities are daunting, but the ultimate principle is clear:
outright sales of ownership rights in notes, including those secured by
mortgages, are governed by Article 9.
The current version of Article 9 provides two different mecha-
nisms for transferring outright ownership of notes. Assuming that the
transferor has rights in the note and that value is given, a security
interest “attaches” (and ownership is transferred, in the case of an out-
right sale) when either (1) the buyer has taken possession of the note
pursuant to an agreement of sale112 with the seller or (b) the seller has
signed a security agreement, written or electronic, that describes the
note.113 In simplified terms, one might say ownership of notes can be
transferred either by delivery of the notes or by a written document,
such as an assignment of the notes. But that is a bit too simple. If the
transfer is done by delivery of possession, there must also be an agree-
ment of sale – although not necessarily one that is signed, or even in
writing, since there is no requirement that the agreement be “authenti-
cated.”114 Thus, an oral agreement of sale will do. On the other hand, if
there is a written, signed (“authenticated”) agreement, such as an exe-
cuted assignment of the notes, ownership will pass without delivery of
possession.
One immediately notices important differences between Article
9’s process for transferring ownership and Article 3’s process for trans-
ferring the right of enforcement. Under Article 3, delivery of possession
of the notes is essential, unless they have been lost or stolen and the
lost note procedure is available. Under Article 9, delivery is optional –
it is merely one way to carry out the transaction. Another difference
lies in the significance of indorsement. Article 3 requires either in-
dorsement of the notes (unless they were originally to bearer) or proof
111. U.C.C. § 9-203.
112. The text says “security agreement,” however, under U.C.C. § 9-102(74), “security
agreement” means an agreement that creates or provides for a security interest. Addition-
ally, in U.C.C. § 1-201(b)(35), “security interest” includes the interest of a buyer in notes.
Hence, in the context of an outright sale, “security agreement” can only mean a sale
agreement.
113. U.C.C. § 9-203(b) (showing that, in the context of an outright sale, “security agree-
ment” must be taken to mean a contract of sale, bill of sale, assignment, or other document
of transfer).
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of the purpose for which they were delivered. Article 9 pays no direct
attention at all to indorsement per se; it is irrelevant.115
As we have already seen, Article 3’s concern with possession is
justified as a borrower-protection device; it helps assure note makers
that they are paying the correct person – the PETE. Buyers of owner-
ship rights in notes have legitimate concerns about title as well.
Assume that Acme Mortgage Company originates a mortgage loan, but
finds itself short of cash or under financial stress. It may be tempted to
“double-sell” the loan to two different secondary market investors.116 If
a sale could be accomplished only by delivery of the note, double-selling
would be very difficult to pull off.117 But since delivery is not necessary,
Acme can simply enter into two different, written, signed note sale
agreements with the two investors, taking care not to let either of them
know about the other. Which of them will prevail? On the basis of what
we have seen thus far, the first buyer, whom we will call Investor A,
appears to own the note simply because he or she obtained it first. This
result would appear to follow even if Investor A does not take posses-
sion of the note (as Investor A need not do to make the transfer
“attach”). Thus the note may be left in Acme’s hands, and Acme can
exhibit or even deliver it to Investor B.118
In most situations, Article 9 resolves conflicts among secured
parties (and recall that note buyers are classified as “secured parties”)
by means of the concept of perfection. In essence, a secured party who
perfects his or her security interest will be protected against later se-
115. Conceivably, the language and signature on an indorsement could satisfy the “au-
thenticated security agreement” requirement of U.C.C. § 9-203(b). See Partney v. Reed, 889
S.W.2d 896, 900 (Mo. Ct. App. 1994) (in which the indorsing transferor wrote words of as-
signment into the indorsement). Indorsement may also be indirectly relevant to the issue of
ownership of a negotiable note, as follows. Under U.C.C. § 9-331(a), Article 9 defers to Arti-
cle 3 to the limited extent that Article 3 determines ownership. Under U.C.C. § 3-306, a
person having rights of a holder in due course takes free of claims to property or possessory
rights in the instrument. Thus, since indorsement is relevant to a determination of holder in
due course status, it may indirectly affect property or ownership claims.
116. Another possibility is that Acme will “double-pledge” the note, giving collateral se-
curity interests in it to two different creditors, or that it will pledge the note to one party
and sell it to another. These alternative scenarios are interesting, but to keep our discussion
simple, and because our focus is on outright sales of notes, we will set them aside.
117. This premise is not quite impossible. See Provident Bank v. Cmty. Home Mortg.
Corp., 498 F. Supp. 2d 558 (E.D.N.Y. 2007) (discussing a case in which the loan originator
had borrowers sign two identical original promissory notes, and subsequently sold them to
two different secondary market investors. The court treated them as a single note and found
that the first secondary market purchaser to take possession had thereby perfected the
transfer, and hence prevailed.).
118. See Barbara M. Goodstein, The Dilemma of Transferability of Mortgage Loans,
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curity interests created by the same debtor. However, when outright
sales of notes are involved, the ordinary rules of perfection under Arti-
cle 9 do not help Investor B, for they provided that a sale of a
promissory note is perfected when it attaches.119 This concept of auto-
matic perfection applies whether attachment is by written assignment
or by delivery of possession. Hence, in the example above, it still ap-
pears that Investor A’s interest will be perfected immediately upon
taking the assignment,120 and Investor A will prevail over Investor B,
even if Investor B buys the note with no knowledge of Investor A’s
claim, and even if Acme retains possession of the note after the trans-
action with Investor A. The assignor’s retention of possession does not
of itself defeat the transfer of ownership.
But under Article 9, not all perfections are created equal. Sec-
tion 9-330(d) creates a sort of super-priority121 that will trump the
priority given by ordinary perfection in some circumstances. It pro-
vides that “a purchaser of an instrument has priority over a security
interest in the instrument perfected by a method other than possession
if the purchaser gives value and takes possession of the instrument in
good faith and without knowledge that the purchase violates the rights
of the secured party.”122 Thus, if Investor B takes possession of the
note, has no knowledge of Investor A’s claim,123 and buys in good faith,
Investor B will get title to the note despite Investor A’s automatic
perfection by attachment. The Official Comment to Section 9-330(d)
makes it clear that possession by Investor B will prevail, assuming
that Investor B satisfies the lack of knowledge and good faith tests, no
119. U.C.C. § 9-309(4). Under § 9-312(a), a security interest in notes can be perfected by
filing a financing statement as well, but in light of the automatic perfection of outright sales
of notes, there appears to be little incentive to do so. Conceivably, perfection by filing might
be accomplished at an earlier date than perfection by attachment.
120. This rule is very convenient to Investor A above if the debtor-transferor files bank-
ruptcy, since it means that the investor need not take any other action to be fully protected
against the trustee in bankruptcy’s strong-arm powers as a perfected lien creditor under
Bankruptcy Code § 544. Indeed, the apparent purpose of Article 9’s “automatic perfection”
provision for notes was to insulate issuers of mortgage-backed securities and other securi-
tization vehicles from attacks by the trustees in bankruptcy of original payees of the
obligations in question.
121. See Steven L. Harris & Charles W. Mooney, Jr., Using First Principles of UCC
Article 9 to Solve Statutory Puzzles in Receivables Financing, 46 GONZAGA L. REV. 297, 347
(2010) (Harris and Mooney, the reporters for revised Article 9, use the term “super-priority”
to refer to the operation of § 9-330.).
122. U.C.C. § 9-330(d).
123. Only actual knowledge will defeat Investor B’s claim under § 9-330(d), since under
U.C.C. § 1-202(b), knowledge means actual knowledge. See Merrill Lynch Bus. Fin. Servs.,
Inc. v. Kupperman, 2010 WL 2179181, at *27 (D.N.J., May 28, 2010), aff’d, 441 F. App’x 938
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matter what method of perfection Investor A used.124 Hence, the filing
of a financing statement by Investor A will not improve his or her posi-
tion.125 The only safe way for Investor A to avoid the risk of loss from
Acme’s misconduct is to get possession of the note so that Acme will not
be able to deliver it to a subsequent buyer. If neither party takes pos-
session, Investor A will win by virtue of automatic perfection by
attachment, but if either party takes possession, that party will
prevail.126
If we look at Articles 3 and 9 in the aggregate, taking possession
of the note kills two birds with one stone. Possession is essential to
constitute the note buyer a holder, a PETE, and potentially a holder in
due course under Article 3, and, at the same time, it will give the buyer
protection against competing buyers or security interest holders from
the same seller under Section 9-330(d). We saw earlier that one can
buy ownership of a note under Article 9 either by taking possession or
by taking a separate document of assignment.127 It is now apparent
that the first of these two methods is by far the safer course for a note
buyer. Not only does it eliminate problems of enforcement if the note is
negotiable,128 but it also eliminates the risk of losing ownership
through the misconduct by the note’s seller.
C. Getting the Economic Benefits of the Mortgage
When the note is secured by a real estate mortgage, the note
buyer obviously wants the benefits of the mortgage as well as the note.
Prior to the adoption of the 1998 version of Article 9, there was consid-
erable confusion as to what steps needed to be taken by the note buyer
to obtain and perfect ownership of the mortgage. But under the current
version, this issue is resolved by the text of the Code itself and is no
longer debatable. It states both that the attachment of a security inter-
est to an obligation secured by real estate operates to attach the
security interest to the underlying interest in real estate,129 and that
“perfection of a security interest in a right to payment or performance
also perfects a security interest in a security interest, mortgage, or
124. U.C.C. § 9-330(d), cmt. 7 (2000).
125. Id.
126. See Julian B. McDonnell & John Franklin Hitchcock, Jr., The Sale of Promissory
Notes Under Revised Article 9: Cooking Securitization Stew, 117 BANKING L.J. 99, 111-13
(2000).
127. U.C.C. § 9-203(b).
128. See supra text accompanying notes 86-93.
129. U.C.C. § 9-203(g). Remember that the term “security interest” includes transfers of
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other lien on personal or real property securing the right.”130 Thus, no
separate act (such as executing and delivering a mortgage assignment
or recording it in the real estate records) is necessary to ensure perfec-
tion with respect to the mortgage.131
Commentators often say that this language implements the
“mortgage follows the note” concept of the common law.132 But the real-
ity is a bit more complex and requires further explanation; we must
make it clear which aspect of the mortgage we are talking about. We
have already seen that the right of enforcement of the mortgage—that
is, foreclosure—follows the right of enforcement of the note.133 That
connection between the note and mortgage is a common law principle,
and because it deals with enforcement rather than ownership, it has
nothing at all to do with Article 9.
On the other hand, the Article 9 provisions just mentioned,134
which ensure that attachment and perfection of ownership in the note
will extend to the mortgages as well, are ownership provisions. Owner-
ship determines who is entitled to the economic benefits of the note,
and by the extension of these provisions, the mortgage. Thus, a fair
summary of the overall connection between notes and mortgages is the
following: the right of enforcement (i.e., foreclosure) of the mortgage
follows the right of enforcement of the note as a matter of common law.
The right to the economic benefits of the mortgages (i.e., the proceeds
of foreclosure) follows the right to the economic benefits of the note by
virtue of the attachment and perfection provisions of Article 9. These
principles are straightforward and simple, although they often seem to
be misunderstood.
Taking possession of the note is not mandatory, but it is the
only sensible course for wise secondary mortgage market investors.
This is not to say that taking possession is easy or convenient. It is not.
Particularly in a market in which massive loan transfers take place,
with hundreds or thousands of notes changing hands on a continual
basis, possession is burdensome and costly. Most investors use sepa-
rate custodians to hold their notes, but this necessitates contracting
130. U.C.C. § 9-308(e).
131. U.C.C. § 9-308, Legislative Note recommends that the state’s recording act be
amended to make it clear that real estate recording is unnecessary in this setting.
132. See, e.g., Douglas J. Whaley, Mortgage Foreclosures, Promissory Notes, and the
Uniform Commercial Code, 39 W. ST. U. L. REV. 313 (2012).
133. See supra text accompanying notes 95-102. Exceptions exist in about a dozen states
in which other or additional requirements for standing to foreclose are imposed by specific
foreclosure statutes. See Whitman & Milner, supra note 24.
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with, establishing standards for, and compensating the custodians.135
If the note is sold and the buyer wishes to continue to use the same
custodian, records must be kept to show that authority to direct the
custodian has been transferred. An actual note need be produced for
purposes of borrower examination or litigation on only relatively rare
occasions, but there must be an established procedure for doing so. The
system requires moving tangible pieces of paper around the country
and keeping track of them. It seems outdated, even archaic. But, it can
be made to work, and it can consistently produce satisfactory legal
results.
IV. TRANSFERRING NONNEGOTIABLE NOTES
At last we arrive at the principal point of this article: how are
nonnegotiable notes to be transferred? We begin with the proposition
that, just as with negotiable notes, the transfer of nonnegotiable notes
must be considered under two separate headings: transfers of the right
of enforcement and transfers of ownership.
Of course, the bifurcation of ownership and enforcement is
forced upon us for negotiable notes by the structure of the Uniform
Commercial Code, as discussed in detail above. The Code does not com-
pel a similar bifurcation for nonnegotiable notes, since it says nothing
at all about transfers of the right to enforce nonnegotiable notes. More-
over, one will look in vain in the case law of nonnegotiable notes for
any clue that ownership and the right to enforce are distinct from one
another. But that should not deter our inquiry. The one fixed position,
from which we cannot vary in the absence of a wholesale revision of the
Code, is that Article 9 tells us how ownership of all notes is trans-
ferred, whether they are negotiable or not.136 If the common law rules
for transferring the right of enforcement of nonnegotiable notes are dif-
ferent than the Article 9 rules for transferring their ownership, then
135. On the widespread use of custodians, see AMERICAN SECURITIZATION FORUM, TRANS-
FER AND ASSIGNMENT OF RESIDENTIAL MORTGAGE LOANS IN THE SECONDARY MORTGAGE
MARKET 3-4 (2010), https://www.mersinc.org/media-room-docman/52-asf-white-paper-11-16-
10/file.
136. See U.C.C. § 9-102(a)(47). This follows from the definition of “instrument” in U.C.C.
§ 9-102(a)(47), as a document of a “type that in ordinary business is transferred by delivery
with any necessary indorsement or assignment.” There is universal agreement that this
covers all notes, irrespective of their negotiability. Indeed, nonnegotiable notes are some-
times termed “Article 9 notes” for this reason. It must be conceded that in a sense the
definition is circular: Article 9 defines an instrument as a document that is customarily
transferred by delivery, and then goes on, in § 9-203, to affirmatively state that instruments
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ownership and the right of enforcement are bifurcated, whether any-
one says so overtly or not.
Everything Article 9 tells us about notes applies irrespective of
their negotiability:137 how to transfer their ownership (either by writ-
ten document of assignment or by delivery of possession),138 how to
perfect when they are sold (perfection is automatic),139 and how to at-
tach and perfect transfers of real estate security along with them (once
again, it’s automatic).140 The super-priority given to buyers who take
possession of notes under Section 9-330(d) works in the same manner
whether the notes are negotiable or not. These matters are settled.
Hence, there is less to talk about on the topic of transferring nonnegoti-
able notes than we might have expected. The only real issue remaining
is how to deal with transfers of the right to enforce, or even whether
such transfers ought to receive separate treatment from transfers of
ownership at all.
A. Judge-Made Law on Transfers of the Right to Enforce
Nonnegotiable Notes
Since there is no uniform statute or code governing transfers of
the right of enforcement of nonnegotiable notes, we must turn to case
law.141 As we have already noted, the cases are mostly old (i.e., the late
Nineteenth to mid-Twentieth Centuries) and draw no distinction be-
tween ownership and the right of enforcement, but consistently treat
the two sets of rights in a unitary manner. But even though they re-
gard ownership and the right to enforce as coextensive,142 we focus
here on the cases addressing the right of enforcement, rather than
cases in which ownership is the issue.
The overwhelming impression one gains from these cases is
that all agree that the right to enforce a nonnegotiable note can be
transferred in exactly the same way as a negotiable note – by indorse-
137. The one exception to this statement is the deference given by § 9-331(d) to Article 3
and the holder in due course concept. See supra note 115.
138. See supra text accompanying notes 111-12.
139. See supra text accompanying notes 117-18.
140. See supra text accompanying notes 124-27.
141. To a considerable degree, this discussion relies upon Willier, supra note 1, which
appears to be the only thorough treatment of the topic published in the Twentieth Century.
142. For one of many examples, see Krieg v. Palmer Nat’l Bank, 111 N.E. 31, 33 (Ind.
App. 1916) (“The effect of these unrestricted indorsements and the delivery of the certificate
to appellee was to invest appellee with the legal title to and the possession of the certificate,
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ment (if the note is not bearer paper)143 and delivery.144 Beyond this,
however, the cases diverge. A few take the view that indorsement and
delivery is the only way the transfer can be accomplished,145 but a sub-
stantial majority also recognize the validity of a transfer by a separate
document of assignment, without indorsement or delivery of the note
itself.146 Indeed, there is a minority line of cases holding that an as-
signment of the mortgage will also transfer the note automatically147 –
143. It is unclear to what extent modern courts would apply the “nonholder with the
rights of a holder” concept of U.C.C. § 3-301 to allow transfer of a non-bearer nonnegotiable
note without indorsement; there is simply too little indication in the existing cases. How-
ever, RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 332, cmt. c and illus. 4 suggest that a
gratuitous delivery of a nonnegotiable note will transfer the right to enforce it, even without
indorsement. See, e.g., Partney v. Reed, 889 S.W.2d 896, 900 (Mo. Ct. App. 1994) (recogniz-
ing that the right of enforcement of a nonnegotiable certificate of deposit could be
transferred by delivery without indorsement); Hileman v. Hulver, 221 A.2d 693, 698 (Md.
1966) (recognizing a savings account passbook could be transferred by delivery without
indorsement).
144. First Nat’l Bank of San Diego v. Falkenhan, 29 P. 866, 866-67 (Cal. 1892) (payee
becomes liable in same manner as an indorser of a negotiable note); Dollar v. Int’l Banking
Corp., 109 P. 499, 502 (Cal. Ct. App. 1910) (regarding a deposit receipt); Birmingham Trust
& Sav. Co. v. Jackson Cnty. Mill Co., 27 So. 43, 43 (Fla. 1899) (nonnegotiable note; under
Florida statute, transfer may be by indorsement or by assignment); Krieg v. Palmer Nat’l
Bank, 111 N.E. 31, 34-36 (Ind. App. 1916) (nonnegotiable certificate of deposit); Gidden Mo-
tor Co. v. Johnston, 124 So. 367, 368 (Miss. 1929) (certificate of claim on bank issued by
state banking department); Sebring v. Fagin, 141 P.2d 792, 793 (Okl. 1943) (state warrant);
Wood v. Sparks, 42 S.W.2d 142, 144 (Tex. Civ. App. 1931), rev’d on other grounds, 59 S.W.2d
361 (Tex. Comm’n App. 1933) (note evidencing mechanics lien); Swedish-Am. Bank of Min-
neapolis v. Koebernick, 117 N.W. 1020, 1021 (Wis. 1908) (nonnegotiable note).
145. Bonhiver v. State Bank of Clearing, 331 N.E.2d 390, 397 (Ill. App. 1975) (nonnego-
tiable certificate of deposit); Bouton v. Cameron, 68 N.E. 800, 807 (Ill. 1903) (but transfer by
separate assignment is enforceable in equity); Lowrey v. Danforth, 69 S.W. 39, 41 (Mo. App.
1902); Plattsmouth State Bank v. Redding, 258 N.W. 661 (Neb. 1935) (requiring delivery
along with assignment). But see Kaw Valley State Bank & Trust v. Commercial Bank of
Liberty, 567 S.W.2d 710, 712 (Mo. Ct. App. 1978) (recognizing a collateral pledge of a note
effectuated by both delivery and a separate assignment).
146. Tackett v. First Sav. of Arkansas, 810 S.W.2d 927, 930 (Ark. 1991); Dollar v. Int’l
Banking Corp., 109 P. 499, 503 (Cal. Ct. App. 1910); Moses v. Woodward, 140 So. 651, 653
(Fla. 1932), aff’d, 147 So. 690 (Fla. 1933); Allen v. Commercial Credit Co., 117 S.E. 650, 651
(Ga. 1923); Felin Assocs. v. Rogers, 326 N.Y.S.2d 413, 415 (N.Y. App. Div. 1971); Nw. Nat’l
Ins. Co. v. Crockett, 857 S.W.2d 757, 758 (Tex. App. 1993); Thatcher v. Merriam, 240 P.2d
266, 270-71 (Ut. 1952) (assignment treated as a “constructive delivery” of note). This conclu-
sion is consistent with RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 324 (1981), which provides
that an assignment of a contract right may be made if the obligee “manifest[s] an intention
to transfer the right to another person without further action or manifestation of intention
by the oblige.”
147. Berhe v. Fed. Nat’l Mortg. Ass’n, 2013 WL 5234301 (D. Nev. Sept. 16, 2013); Sea-
bury v. Hemley, 56 So. 530 (Ala. 1911); Lawyers Title Ins. Co. v. Novastar Mortg., Inc., 862
So. 2d 793 (Fla. App. 2004); Andrews v. Townshend, 1 N.Y.S. 421 (N.Y. 1888); Fed. Home
Loan Mortg. Corp. v. Rufo, 983 N.E.2d 406, 413 (Ohio App. 2012); Fed. Home Loan Mortg.
Corp. v. Koch, 2013 WL 5532836 (Ohio App. Oct. 7, 2013); Reynolds v. Bank of America,
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a proposition that can only be true if the note is nonnegotiable, of
course, since the right to enforce a negotiable note can be transferred
only by delivery.148
B. Is There a Problem Here?
Should the law allow transfers of the right to enforce nonnegoti-
able notes by separate written assignment? One might argue
formalistically that, since Article 9 allows ownership to be transferred
by assignment, there is no logical objection to permitting transfers of
the right of enforcement by assignment as well. Of course, permitting
it creates a sharp distinction between negotiable and nonnegotiable
notes, but it is arguable that there is nothing inherently wrong with
that.
Still, recognizing that PETE status for nonnegotiable notes can
be transferred without delivery of possession means that something
important is missing. Recall our previous discussion of the “title assur-
ance” function of the requirement of delivery of possession for
negotiable notes.149 Because, by the majority view, the law does not
require delivery in order to transfer the right of enforcement of non-
negotiable notes, this “title assurance” function of delivery is lost if the
note is nonnegotiable. In other words, possession is not a reliable indi-
cium of the right to enforce nonnegotiable notes, as it is for negotiable
notes. At first blush, this seems like a serious problem.
But things are not as bad as they seem. Even though the com-
mon law of nonnegotiable notes provides no incentive for note buyers to
take possession, we have already seen that Article 9 does, since it is
only by taking possession that a note buyer can gain the immensely
valuable super-priority benefits of Section 9-330(d).150 Since investors
in the secondary mortgage market ordinarily want both ownership and
the right of enforcement, they routinely demand possession of the non-
negotiable notes they buy for the purpose of satisfying Section 9-
330(d). For this reason, a buyer in the position of Investor B in our
illustration above, if knowledgeable or well-advised, will insist upon
of trust without the note automatically passes the debt.”); W.D. Rollison, Priorities in the
Law of Mortgages, 9 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 50, 86 (1933); Phillip C. Ransdell, Note, Effect of
Assignment Without Assigning the Debt—Formalities Necessary to Transfer the Mortgagee’s
Title to the Mortgaged Property, 36 N.C. L. REV. 225 (1958) (discussing Gregg v. Williamson,
98 S.E.2d 481 (N.C. 1957)).
148. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP. MORTGAGES § 5.4(b) (1997) (providing that such
a transfer of the note will take effect only if U.C.C. Article 3 does not preclude it).
149. See supra text accompanying note 91.
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production of the original note, even if it is nonnegotiable, and will re-
fuse to enter into the purchase if the note cannot be delivered. Thus, as
a practical matter, being able to deliver possession is the touchstone of
the power to sell the note. It is Article 9, not the common law of notes,
that produces this result. As a practical matter, although not in ex-
press terms, Article 9 provides the mechanism to validate a transfer of
the right of enforcement of a nonnegotiable note that the common law
of notes lacks. If a nonnegotiable note’s owner offers to sell the note,
but is unable to deliver its possession, the owner may in theory still
have a right of enforcement to transfer, but as a practical matter that
right is likely to be unsalable.
The conclusion, then, is that the missing requirement of deliv-
ery of possession for transferring the right to enforce nonnegotiable
notes is not really much of a problem. In effect, PETE status for non-
negotiable notes “piggy-backs” on the possession advantage of Section
9-330(d). As a practical matter, there is little functional difference be-
tween secondary market sales of negotiable and nonnegotiable notes,
despite the formal distinctions outlined above between Article 3 and
the common law. The system works as well for nonnegotiable notes as
it does for negotiable notes.
CONCLUSION
There is no need to revise the law for nonnegotiable notes per
se. But as we have already observed, our system for transferring all
notes, negotiable and nonnegotiable, is archaic and unwieldy. In an age
when virtually all other financial instruments are transferred and
stored electronically, it seems little short of bizarre that we continue to
package up paper notes and ship them around the nation. The process
is costly and fraught with potential error. The sloppiness with which
the system operated during the fevered days before the crash of the
mortgage market in 2007 has provided a great deal of grist for the fore-
closure defense bar, but it also affords ample proof that the system
needs reform. Surely we can, and should, do better.
There is hope that an alternative can be fashioned. Under the
leadership of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, a statute is being
drafted that would create a national mortgage registry. If such a stat-
ute is enacted, it will allow market participants to eliminate the
physical movement of paper notes, at least those secured by real es-
tate.151 It will allow electronic registration of every transfer of every
151. The characteristics attributed to the statute in the text are, of necessity, somewhat
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mortgage loan. It will apply equally to negotiable and nonnegotiable
notes. It will disclose upon request the identity of the person in legal
possession of each registered mortgage note. In this way, it will provide
an immediately accessible on-line record of the right to enforce the
note.
Those working on the design of this system believe it could be
implemented with virtually no change in or preemption of either Arti-
cle 3 or Article 9, except to provide that electronic registration has the
legal effect of possession of the note. Use of the registration system
would be voluntary, but its advantages would be so obvious that it
would likely become predominant or even nearly universal in use
within a short time.
How would such a system work? When a loan was originated,
the mortgage would be recorded in the local real estate records as at
present, since this would be necessary to establish the mortgage’s pri-
ority as against other real property interests. Immediately thereafter,
the note would be registered in the national system, and an entry
would made in the local records to indicate that this had been done and
to provide the public with the loan’s unique identifying number in the
national registry. From that point forward, all secondary market
transactions would be shown only in the registry. Transfers within the
registry would be deemed public notice, so that recording of mortgage
assignments locally would be unnecessary. If the loan was paid off in
due course, the registry would provide a certificate recordable in the
local real estate records so indicating, thus discharging the mortgage of
record. If a foreclosure became necessary, the registry would issue a
certificate, usable in the local foreclosure process, showing the identity
of the current registrant and thus attesting to that party’s standing to
foreclose.
When a loan was registered in the national system, the original
note would be destroyed, but as mentioned above, registration would
be deemed the equivalent of possession of the note. When a registrant
transferred the note, it might or might not be indorsed at the parties’
election (as at present), but the electronic transfer would be deemed to
pass possession to the new registrant, and to have been made for the
purpose of transferring the right of enforcement. Thus, at a minimum,
the new registrant would be entitled to claim “nonholder with the
serves as a consultant to the Federal Reserve Bank of New York on the drafting project
described in the text. For some earlier thoughts on the structure of such a statute, see Dale
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rights of a holder” status,152 and thereby to be the PETE. Any regis-
trant, by virtue of being deemed in possession of the note, would also
be entitled to ownership under Article 9 if a suitable agreement of sale
existed, and to have the special super-priority rights granted to note
possessors by section 9-330(d), as discussed above.153
Thus this system could completely eliminate the need for both
delivery of possession of original notes and the recording of interim
mortgage assignments, replacing both with a simple electronic transfer
process. It could do so with only the barest minimum of intrusion into
the present legal regime represented by Articles 3 and 9. For purposes
of transferring both PETE status and ownership, no difference would
exist in this system between negotiable and nonnegotiable notes. How-
ever, the registry process would not change the holder in due course
concept and (assuming it is not changed by other law), only notes that
were originally negotiable could confer holder in due course status on
registrants.
Thus far, this is only an incipient proposal, being circulated
among industry participants for comment and feedback, and not yet
presented to any legislative body, state or federal. It is my view that
enactment would best come from Congress rather than state legisla-
tures. Either way, gaining adoption of such a statute, particularly in
the current polarized political environment, is a daunting task. Let us
hope that in the not-so-distant future, the touchstone of both owner-
ship and the right of enforcement of mortgage notes will be electronic,
rather than physical, possession.
152. See supra text accompanying note 80.
153. See supra text accompanying notes 120-22.
